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Article
THE CLAIM GAME: ANALYZING THE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF
STUDENT-ATHLETE INSURANCE POLICY PAYOUTS
KATHRYN KISSKA-SCHULZE* & ADAM EPSTEIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 2016–2017 college football season, quarterback
Deshaun Watson accepted a pair of $5 million disability insurance
policies paid for by Clemson University to protect against a cata-
strophic career-ending injury and potential loss-of-value he might
suffer in the National Football League (NFL) draft if he sustained
an injury while playing for the Tigers.1  Watson is not the only stu-
dent-athlete who has ever accepted disability insurance coverage
paid for by their university, and it turned out to be an astute deci-
sion as Watson was a back-to-back Heisman Trophy finalist who en-
tered the 2017 NFL Draft as a top overall pick.2
For the small number of elite student-athletes whose athletic
prowess garner professional draft potential, enrolling in the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Exceptional Stu-
dent-Athlete Disability Insurance (“ESDI”) and loss-of-value
(“LOV”) insurance programs may be a crucial step in protecting
against career-ending injuries and loss of future earnings as profes-
sional athletes.3  Recognizing that these student-athletes might,
* J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor, College of Business, School of Accountancy,
Clemson University.
** J.D./M.B.A., Professor, Department of Finance and Law, Central Michigan
University.
1. See Brett McMurphy, Tigers QB Deshaun Watson Takes out $5 Million Insurance
Policies, ESPN (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/
17328331/clemson-tigers-qb-deshaun-watson-takes-5-million-insurance-policies
[https://perma.cc/PU6C-NPMB].
2. See Alex Kirshner, 2016 Heisman Trophy Finalists: Lamar Jackson Joined by 4
Others, SB NATION (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/
2016/12/5/13837236/heisman-trophy-finalists-2016-list [https://perma.cc/DBE3-
Z5WY] (noting that Watson was finalist for Heisman Trophy for second consecu-
tive year). See also Adam Wells, Top Reaction After Texans Trade up to Draft Deshaun
Watson in 2017 NFL Draft, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 27, 2017), http://bleacherre-
port.com/articles/2698765-top-reaction-after-texans-trade-up-to-draft-deshaun-wat
son-in-2017-nfl-draft [https://perma.cc/23LN-CR9S] (reporting that Watson was
the 12th overall pick by the Houston Texans in the 2017 NFL draft).
3. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-programs [https://perma.cc/
(231)
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however, forfeit their remaining years of collegiate eligibility to sign
with an agent and enter a professional draft, some universities are
selectively paying the premiums for ESDI and LOV insurance poli-
cies to entice star student-athletes to stay at the institutions for an-
other season.4  In a big-money industry where twenty-seven schools
now top the $100 million revenue mark from their athletic depart-
ments, universities have a vested interest in retaining top players for
whom these policies are purchased.5
A curious question regarding ESDI and LOV premiums paid
for by universities is whether an injury-related payout to a student-
athlete-beneficiary amounts to a taxable event at the federal level.
From its origination in the U.S. Constitution granting Congress the
power to “lay and collect taxes,” a major justification of the federal
government’s taxing power is to raise revenue.6  To help meet reve-
nue needs, Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 61 dictates that gross
income include “all income from whatever source derived.”7  This
rule carries numerous exceptions, including amounts received
from disability payouts when an individual pays the entire cost of a
health or accident insurance plan out of their own pocket.8  How-
ever, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally requires that in-
surance payouts received through accident or health plans paid for
by an employer be reported as income to the beneficiary.9  Because
the IRS and the American legal system have thus far not character-
ized student-athletes as employees of their academic institutions,
and because the Code and Treasury Regulations (“Treas. Regs.”)
provide no guidance on the tax consequences of payouts received
from insurance policies purchased by non-employers, analyzing the
MU5G-LFAC] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Student-Athlete Insurance Pro-
grams]. See also Loss-of-Value Insurance Information, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/insurance/loss-value-insurance-information [https://perma.cc/
3XCN-CXPY] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Loss-of-Value Insurance
Information].
4. See Marc Tracy, Insurance Doesn’t Eliminate Risk for Top College Athletes Who
Forgo Draft, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/
sports/ncaafootball/insurance-doesnt-eliminate-risk-for-top-college-athletes-who-
forgo-draft.html (documenting various college athletic programs that have paid
for loss-of-value insurance policies on behalf of star student-athletes, including
Florida State, Texas A&M, and University of Georgia).
5. See Cork Gaines, The 27 Schools That Make at Least $100 Million in College
Sports, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/schools-
most-revenue-college-sports-texas-longhorns-2017-11/#27-university-of-virginia-
1006-million-1 [https://perma.cc/U6NC-UCZ8].
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
7. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012).
8. See id. § 104(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(d) (2017).
9. 26 U.S.C. §105(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(a).
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taxability of ESDI and LOV payouts when the premiums are paid
for by universities provides an important addition to academic and
practitioner literature.10
This article focuses on two scenarios to determine whether in-
jury payouts received by student-athletes are taxable at the federal
level when their universities pay for the insurance premiums.  We
first explore the tax consequences of payouts if the premium pay-
ments are either purchased individually by the student-athlete or
financed through a private loan from a third party.  Second, we ex-
amine the taxability of payouts when a college or university pays the
cost of the premium for the benefit of the select student-athlete.
We surmise that to best ensure a tax-free payout from an ESDI or
LOV insurance policy following injury, a student-athlete should
purchase the policy individually.  We also conclude that treating
premium payments as a loan provides a sound opportunity to mini-
mize or eliminate tax imposition on payouts received following a
catastrophic injury so long as the loan is structured properly.  We
finally conclude that the IRS is unlikely to impose a tax on disability
payouts made to student-athletes when their college or university
pays the premium on their behalf.
Our analysis is based on ambiguity in the IRC and the premise
that the IRS has historically been reluctant to impose taxes on stu-
dent-athletes, as well as the college sports industry in general.  How-
ever, because the language of the IRC does not specifically address
the tax consequences of a non-employer paying the cost of disabil-
ity insurance premium on behalf of a third party, we further recom-
mend that the IRS publish a Revenue Ruling to address the
taxability of proceeds received from disability insurance policies
purchased for student-athletes by their universities to clarify
whether or not universities are considered employers in this con-
text, provide uniformity in applying the IRC to disability insurance
policies paid for by universities, and confirm whether the IRS in-
tends to continue its historically favorable tax treatment of student-
athletes by excluding their benefits from falling under the umbrella
of taxable income.11
10. As of the date of this article, no situation has been publicized where pro-
ceeds have been distributed to an injured student-athlete under a disability insur-
ance policy that was purchased by a university on behalf of the student-athlete.
However, as will be discussed in this article, there have been instances where pro-
ceeds have been distributed to injured student-athletes under policies purchased
by the beneficiary himself or herself.
11. See, e.g., JOHN A. KOSKINEN, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS.: IRS, No. 2014-0016 (Apr.
9, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf [https://perma.cc/35YH-
CYSH] (letter from John A. Koskinen to Senator Richard Burr (R-N.C.)).  This
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To better understand the parameters of our analyses and con-
clusions, Part I discusses ESDI and LOV insurance policies as sup-
ported by the NCAA.  Part II analyzes the federal tax consequences
of insurance policy payouts as imposed by the IRC.  Part III dissects
policy arguments surrounding the imposition of tax and employ-
ment litigation in the college sports industry.  Part IV examines the
taxability of ESDI and LOV insurance policies based on whether
premiums are paid for by student-athletes individually, financed
through a loan agreement with a third party, or purchased outright
by a university on behalf of its student-athlete-beneficiary.  Finally,
Part V offers conclusions to help address the ambiguities surround-
ing the tax implications of disability insurance policy payouts when
covered student-athletes suffer career-ending injuries.
II. DISABILITY AND DRAFT PROTECTION INSURANCE FOR
TOMORROW’S PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
In 1990, the NCAA enacted the ESDI Program to protect elite
student-athletes against future lost earnings as professional athletes
due to disabling injuries or sicknesses that may occur during their
college career.12  To qualify for ESDI benefits, the injury or illness
sustained must be career-ending, thereby preventing the player
from ever competing as a professional athlete.13  Distinguishable
from ESDI insurance, LOV coverage is typically purchased the year
leading up to professional draft eligibility, attempting to shield stu-
dent-athletes’ professional contract value from falling below a cer-
tain draft-rank threshold due to the significant injury or illness.14
letter is Koskinen’s response to Burr’s March 28, 2014 letter to Koskinen, Commis-
sioner of the IRS until November 12, 2017, in which Burr requested confirmation
of the current federal tax treatment of college athletic scholarships. Id.  In his
response to that letter, Koskinen stated that “[i]t has long been the position of the
Internal Revenue Service that athletic scholarships can qualify for exclusion from
income under section 117.” Id.  The letter further states with regard to the 1977
Revenue Ruling 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47, that “the athletic scholarship awarded by
the university is primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing their studies and, there-
fore, is excludable under section 117.” Id.
12. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3 (offering that the inau- R
gural NCAA ESDI insurance program was only available to elite men’s football and
basketball players).  The program was later expanded in 1991 to include elite base-
ball players, in 1993 to include men’s ice hockey, and again in 1998 to include
women’s basketball. Id.
13. See Daniel J. Kain et al., Draft Protection Insurance: Elite Athlete Loss-of-Value
Policies and the Emerging Wave of Coverage Litigation, 4 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J.
217, 233 (2017).
14. Loss-of-Value FAQs, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insur-
ance/loss-value-faqs [https://perma.cc/5M6A-XAH8] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
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Recently, LOV insurance has generated interest following for-
mer student-athletes Christian McCaffrey’s (Stanford University)
and Leonard Fournette’s (Louisiana State University) decisions to
skip the 2016 college bowl games for fear of injuries that could have
diminished their 2017 professional football draft rankings and ath-
letic careers.15  Also recently, Michigan tight end, Jake Butt, who
suffered a torn ACL in the 2016 Orange Bowl, entertained media
blitz in 2017 following announcements that he would collect on a
LOV policy he had purchased prior to the start of the season.16
Although some student-athletes have successfully collected
ESDI payouts after sustaining injuries, only a handful of college ath-
letes have collected payouts arising from LOV policies.17  Several
lawsuits, however, have been filed since 2015 involving former col-
lege athletes who were denied claims under LOV policies following
injury.18
While student-athletes generally have access to various insur-
ance options depending on their NCAA Division (I, II, III), their
sport, and their status as an elite athlete, access to ESDI and LOV
insurance policies are the critical focus of this article.19  The re-
mainder of this section explains in detail both (a) permanent total
15. See Dennis Dodd, Jaylon Smith’s Insurance Payout Could Lead to More Players
Skipping Bowl Games, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.cbssports.com/col-
lege-football/news/jaylon-smiths-insurance-payout-could-lead-to-more-players-skip-
ping-bowl-games/ [https://perma.cc/6BVN-3GJB].
16. Penn Collins, College Athletes Are Now Protecting Themselves with ‘Career Protec-
tion’ Insurance Policies, GOOD SPORTS (May 4, 2017), https://sports.good.is/articles/
college-athletes-insurance [https://perma.cc/W7CL-ZNNM].
17. See Richard C. Giller, Lawsuits Involving Former USC Football Stars Shine a
Light on the Murky World of Loss-of-Value Insurance, POLSINELLI, http://www.polsinelli
.com/~/media/Intelligence%20Documents/gillerlossofvalueinsurancefinal
authcheckdam (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (noting that some athletes have success-
fully collected permanent total disability payouts, but that no athletes have report-
edly been successful in collecting LOV payouts). See also Dodd, supra note 15 R
(documenting that Jaylon Smith (Notre Dame), Ifo Ekpre-Olomu (Oregon), E.J.
Bibbs (Iowa State), and Silas Redd (University of Southern California (USC)) have
received LOV payouts following injuries).
18. See Giller, supra note 17. See also Kain et al, supra note 13, at 220 (citing to R
Lee v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 2:15-cv-01614-ODW-JC (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2015); Breslin v. Amtrust at Lloyd’s Ltd., 2:15-cv-00330-R-AS (C.D. Cal. Jan.
15, 2015); Breslin v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. BC592870 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28,
2015)).
19. Insurance options allowable by the NCAA include personal medical insur-
ance coverage for expenses arising from injuries sustained while participating in a
covered athletic event, and disability insurance coverage which includes cata-
strophic and ESDI insurance.  For more information, see NCAA, 2017–18 NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL, art. § 3.2.4.8 [hereinafter 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL], available at
https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4511-2017-2018-ncaa-division-i-manual-au
gust-version-available-august-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/XAD6-H64U]. See also
Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. R
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disability and (b) draft protection insurance coverage options that
are available to elite student-athletes.
A. Permanent Total Disability Insurance
The traditional purpose of disability insurance is to “protect a
person from a loss of income during a period of incapacity for
work.”20  Disability insurance is generally offered in one of two
forms: permanent (an injury resulting in perpetual loss of work)
and temporary (an injury resulting in short-term loss of work).21
The NCAA sponsors two types of disability insurance programs for
student-athletes: Catastrophic Injury Insurance and Exceptional
Student-Athlete Disability.22  Each of these policy programs is dis-
cussed separately below.
1. Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program
Effective August 1, 2005, the NCAA Division I Bylaws (“By-
laws”) require that member institutions certify that every student-
athlete have personal medical insurance coverage for expenses aris-
ing from injuries sustained while participating in a covered athletic
event.23  The Bylaws further require that any medical expenses ex-
ceeding $90,000 be covered by the NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insur-
ance Program (“CIIP”).24
The CIIP covers student-athletes who are “catastrophically in-
jured while participating in a covered intercollegiate athletic activ-
ity.”25  This program, which insures student-athletes at any of the
20. Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, The Legal & Business Aspects of Career-
Ending Disability Insurance Policies in Professional and College Sports, 17 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 473, 482 (2010) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 816 (8th ed. 2004)).
21. See id.
22. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. R
23. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 3.2.4.8 (“An active R
member institution must certify insurance coverage for medical expenses resulting
from athletically related injuries sustained by the following individuals while partic-
ipating in a covered event: A student-athlete participating in a covered-event in an
intercollegiate sports as recognized by the participating institution.”). See also id. at
art. § 3.2.4.8.3 (“Covered Event”) (defining the expression to include team travel,
competition, practices, and conditioning sessions during playing season, as well as
any authorized practice and conditioning sessions organized during off season).
24. Id. at art. § 3.2.4.8.1 (“Amount of Coverage Insurance”) (requiring that
coverage “be of equal or greater value than the deductible of the NCAA cata-
strophic injury insurance program”).  Currently, that deductible stands at $90,000.
Id.
25. Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. See also NCAA Catastrophic R
Injury Insurance Program Benefit Summary for the Period 8/1/17 through 7/31/20, NCAA
[hereinafter NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Benefit Summary], http://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018_17-20%20Cat%20 Benefit%20Summary_
20180105.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMS5-JUQL] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (offer-
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active member NCAA institutions, applies when one of two types of
claims is filed: (1) a serious injury occurs that results in or may re-
sult in a disability, or (2) an injury occurs that is likely to exceed the
NCAA CIIP deductible.26  The premium for the CIIP is paid for by
the NCAA itself, and allows for maximum benefits of $20 million
with a $90,000 deductible.27
Three categories of benefits are available under the CIIP, in-
cluding medical, disability, and death.28  Medical benefits are availa-
ble to insured persons who incur expenses in excess of the
deductible as a result of an injury sustained during a covered
event.29  Disability benefits are available to individuals who are to-
tally or partially disabled while participating in a covered event.30
Although the expression “catastrophic injury” is not specifically de-
fined by the NCAA, it includes injuries that have or may result in a
disability, including severe injuries to the head or spinal cord.31  To-
tal disability includes irrecoverable loss of speech, hearing, sight,
use of limbs, or severely diminished mental capacity due to brain or
other neurological injury.32  In addition to monetary subsidy, other
benefits available include vocational rehabilitation and college edu-
ing that coverage is also available to student coaches, student managers, student
trainers and student cheerleaders).
26. NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Frequently Asked Questions,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018_Cat%20FAQs_20180105
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE73-XZ5G] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (applying to 8/1/
2017 to 7/31/2020 Policy Period).  The NCAA defines “disability” as follows:
The condition of a disability can be determined when the following crite-
ria have been met: (1) The student-athlete’s disability results from an in-
jury or sickness, (2) The student-athlete’s injury or sickness occurs while
the policy is in force, (3) The student-athlete is under the regular care of
a qualified physician, (4) The student-athlete is unable to engage in
sporting activity at the professional level, (5) The applicable elimination
period has elapsed, and (6) The student-athlete’s total disability prevents
him or her from signing any employment contract with any professional
team as a professional athlete in his or her sporting activity.
Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. R
27. See NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Benefit Summary, supra note
25 (noting that deductible decreases to $75,000 for institutions that participate in R
NCAA Group Basic Accident Medical Program).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 26.
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cation.33  Finally, a $25,000 death benefit is payable for death result-
ing from an accident or injury occurring during a covered event.34
While the purpose of the CIIP is to provide a form of disability
insurance to all its covered student-athletes, for a small number the
CIIP is not monetarily protective enough to cover the potential loss
in wages and other income that might affect professionally-bound
elite student-athletes who are injured.  For a finite group, including
star basketball player, Miles Bridges (Michigan State University),
who in April 2017 announced his intent to return to MSU for his
sophomore year in lieu of entering the National Basketball Associa-
tion (NBA) draft, the additional protection offered by ESDI played
a key role in his decision to play another season for the Spartans.35
2. Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability Insurance
The ESDI Program was created to insulate student-athletes pro-
jected to be top-round draft picks by the professional leagues.36  To
be eligible for coverage, the student-athlete must be expected to be
a draftee in either the first two rounds of the NFL or National
Hockey League (NHL) draft, or a first round draft pick in the NBA,
Major League Baseball (MLB), or Women’s National Basketball As-
sociation (WNBA).37  ESDI policies are available through either the
NCAA or private insurers, and they protect against potentially ca-
reer-ending injuries.38
33. See NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Benefit Summary, supra note
25.
34. See id. See also 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 3.2.4.8.3 R
(“Covered Event”) (defining expression to include team travel, competition, prac-
tices, and conditioning sessions during playing season, as well as any authorized
practice and conditioning sessions organized during off season).
35. See Graham Couch, Couch: Miles Bridges Is a Millionaire-in-Waiting, Thanks to
Insurance, LANSING ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2017, 1:25 PM), http://www.lansingstatejournal
.com/story/sports/columnists/graham-couch/2017/04/19/miles-bridges-insur
ance-policy-couch-column/100638812/ [https://perma.cc/SKM7-NH8W].
36. See Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 287, 295 (2016). See also Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3 R
(noting that in 1990, the program was available only to exceptional student-ath-
letes in the sports of football and men’s basketball.  In 1991, the program ex-
panded to include baseball, in 1993 men’s ice hockey became eligible, and in 1998
the program expanded to include women’s basketball).
37. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3 (noting that exceptional R
student-athletes in other sports who have demonstrated a strong likelihood of a
professional career in their sport may be eligible for coverage on a case-by-case
basis).
38. Jill Wieber Lens & Joshua Lens, Insurance Coverage for Elite Athletes, 84 MISS.
L.J. 134, 137 (2014) (noting the insurance can be purchased through the NCAA or
private insurers).
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ESDI offers permanent total disability (“PTD”) coverage that
gives student-athletes protection against “future loss of earnings as a
professional athlete due to a disabling injury or sickness that may
occur during [their] collegiate career.”39  In addition, ESDI pro-
tects student-athletes’ interests against sports agents who might oth-
erwise encourage them to sign up for representation, forfeit their
“amateur” status, and leave college early with remaining eligibility
to instead pursue the professional leagues.40  While maximum cov-
erage limits vary by sport, the amount of coverage available to any
eligible student-athlete is based on their prospective status in the
upcoming draft.41  The ESDI payout is a one-time occurrence and
contingent on the premise that the student-athlete will never be
eligible to play professional sports due to their injury.42
Unlike the CIIP premiums that are paid for by the NCAA, stu-
dent-athletes or their institutions must purchase ESDI coverage on
their own and at their own expense.43  If personal funds are unavail-
able to cover the costs of the premiums, the NCAA allows student-
athletes to take out loans for this purpose.44  As ESDI premium
costs run between $10,000 and $12,000 for each $1 million dollar in
coverage, securing loans to pay these premiums is commonplace.45
Thus, to further incentivize elite student-athletes to return to col-
lege play rather than forego their remaining collegiate eligibility to
enter the professional draft, the NCAA allows them to take out per-
sonal loans against their future earnings without jeopardizing their
amateur status.46
39. Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. R
40. See Wong & Deubert, supra note 20, at 506. R
41. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. R
42. See Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 138. R
43. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, supra note 3. R
44. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 12.1.2.4.4 (“Exception R
for Insurance Against Disabling Injury or Illness, or Loss of Value”) (“An individ-
ual may borrow against his or her future earnings potential from an established,
accredited commercial lending institution exclusively for the purpose of purchas-
ing insurance (with no cash surrender value) against a disabling injury or illness
that would prevent the individual from pursuing a chosen career or for the pur-
pose of purchasing loss-of-value insurance, provided a third party (including a rep-
resentative of an institution’s athletics interests) is not involved in arrangements
for securing the loan.”). See also Glenn M. Wong et al., Going Pro in Sports: Providing
Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 569 (2011).
45. See Wong et al., supra note 44, at 569 (discussing cost of premiums). See R
also Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 145 (noting that the high cost of ESDI premi- R
ums equates to loans being necessary).
46. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 12.1.2.4.4 (“Exception R
for Insurance Against Disabling Injury or Illness, or Loss of Value”). See also Lens
& Lens, supra note 38, at 153–57. R
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While the NCAA and private insurers offer disability insurance
loans to qualifying elite student-athletes, some universities have
chosen to pay the cost of these high premiums on behalf of their
star athletes.47  The NCAA allows schools to use the NCAA Student
Assistance Fund (“SAF”) to purchase these policies on behalf of stu-
dent-athletes.48  As noted, Clemson purchased a $5 million insur-
ance policy to cover any career-ending injury that Deshaun Watson
might have suffered while playing his final year at the university.49
Whether university funds, student-athlete resources, or private
loans are used to secure the price of ESDI premiums, this program
provides some measure of financial security to those premier stu-
dent-athletes interested in postponing their entry into the profes-
sional draft.50  Approximately eighty to one hundred student-
athletes participate in the ESDI program each year, of which 75%
are considered first-round draft picks in the NFL and NBA.51  For
top collegiate athletes in recent years including Johnny Manziel
(Texas A&M), Jadaveon Clowney (University of South Carolina),
and Andrew Luck (Stanford University), securing disability insur-
ance policies to protect against career-ending injuries was critical in
47. See Joseph Stuart Knight, Tackling Problems with the NCAA’s Exceptional Stu-
dent-Athlete Disability Insurance Program, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 157, 162 (2012) (not-
ing that NCAA offers low interest rate loans to pay for premium). See also Student
Athlete Disability Insurance, PETERSEN INT’L UNDERWRITERS, https://www.piu.org/
athlete-disability-insurance/draft-protection [https://perma.cc/ML85-E489] (last
visited Jan. 4, 2018) (providing disability coverage options for elite student-
athletes).
48. See NCAA, Loss-of-Value FAQs, How Can Coverage Be Paid for?, http://www
.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/loss-value-faqs [https://perma.cc/6H7L-
VXUJ] (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
49. See Mandrallius Robinson, Clemson Buys $5 Million Insurance Policy for
Deshaun Watson, GREENVILLE NEWS, http://www.thestate.com/sports/college/acc/
clemson-university/article96498222.html [https://perma.cc/C64Z-TD4C] (last
updated Aug. 19, 2016, 3:50 PM).
50. See, e.g., Mike Herndon, NCAA Insurance Program Protects Elite Athletes, Fu-
ture Earnings Against Injury, AL (Aug. 1, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www.al.com/
sports/index.ssf/2010/08/are_you_in_good_hands.html [https://perma.cc/
U5PC-4P44] (noting various student-athletes who have postponed their draft dates
due to protection afforded by ESDI policies). See also Ross Dellenger, Collins Invests
in Insurance Policy; Peveto Contract Revealed, ADVOC. (July 6, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://
www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_470a2f19-b439-5537-8fa9-
98f60167d225.html [https://perma.cc/X5JT-THJ8] (discussing LSU left tackle
La’el Collins’ decision to pass on NFL draft and return to LSU for his senior year
due to insurance protection); Nick Ironside, Irish’s Smith Takes Advantage of Insur-
ance Options, 247SPORTS (Jan. 5, 2016), http://notredame.247sports.com/Article/
Irishs-Smith-takes-advantage-of-insurance-options-42575472 [https://perma.cc/
8462-5YX5] (documenting Notre Dame players who have purchased ESDI insur-
ance policies).
51. See Wong & Deubert, supra note 20, at 507–08. R
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protecting the possible loss of future professional-athlete income.52
Still, professionally-bound student-athletes who opt to stay in col-
lege an additional year are also likely to consider securing draft-
protection (i.e., LOV) insurance in conjunction with ESDI in order
to protect their professional draft stock.
B. Draft Protection Insurance Coverage
Draft protection, or LOV insurance, protects against the risk
that a student-athlete’s draft stock might decrease below a pre-
scribed threshold following a non-career-ending injury sustained
during college play.53  These policies, which must be purchased in
conjunction with ESDI coverage, specify how far a student-athlete
must fall in the professional draft before coverage is triggered.54
Per NCAA recommendations, only those student-athletes projected
to be a top fifteen NFL draft pick should consider purchasing LOV
insurance.55  Coverage limits are based on a student-athlete’s antici-
pated draft position, and generally range between $1 million and
$10 million.56
Unlike ESDI disability insurance, the NCAA does not provide
LOV insurance.57  Instead, draft protection must be secured
through private insurers, with premiums ranging from $10,000 to
$95,000.58  Similar to ESDI policies, student-athletes who are una-
ble to afford the high cost of LOV premiums are permitted to take
out personal loans against their future earnings.59  The NCAA also
allows member institutions to use money from their SAF to
purchase LOV premiums.60
52. See Kevin Fixler, The $5 Million Question: Should College Athletes Buy Disability
Insurance?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment
/archive/2013/04/the-5-million-question-should-college-athletes-buy-disability-in
surance/274915/.
53. See Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 141. See also Kain et al., supra note 13, at R
218; Loss-of-Value Insurance Information, supra note 3. R
54. See Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 141. See also Loss-of-Value White Paper, R
NCAA http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/loss-value-white-paper
[https://perma.cc/E56H-PTVR] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
55. See Kain et al., supra note 13, at 221. R
56. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 54. R
57. See Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 142. R
58. See id. See also Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 54 (noting that the pri- R
vate insurance company Lloyd’s of London writes the majority of LOV policies for
student-athletes); Kain et al., supra note 13, at 222 (providing data on LOV pre- R
mium cost range).
59. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 16.11.1.4 (“Insurance R
Against Disabling-Injury or Illness, or Loss of Value”).
60. See Kain et al., supra note 13, at 222. R
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The use of the SAF to purchase ESDI and LOV premiums gives
universities a competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining
elite student-athletes who might otherwise leave college prior to
graduation to enter the professional draft.61  However, use of the
SAF to retain top student-athletes has been a debatable issue within
the NCAA and among academics.62  Although coaches and elite stu-
dent-athletes may applaud the use of the SAF as a hedge against
losing star athletes to the professional realm due to a largely unaf-
fordable insurance market, others argue that use of the SAF to
cover expensive insurance premiums for a few takes away from the
use of these funds for the benefit of all other student-athletes.63
Still, no less than fourteen universities have used their SAF funds to
purchase ESDI and LOV insurance policies for select student-ath-
letes, making a strong statement that schools want to retain their
top talent in the billion-dollar college sports industry.64
Media outlets have reported that most participants who
purchase LOV insurance policies rarely receive payouts after sus-
taining injuries.65  The NCAA notes that “the flood of student-ath-
letes currently seeking loss-of-value coverage and pending Lloyd’s
lawsuits for denied claims will impact this tenuous marketplace.”66
Most recently, in May 2017, former Penn State linebacker, Nyeem
61. See id. at 224.
62. See id. (noting that while certain NCAA collegiate executives have ex-
pressed discomfort in member institutions using SAF money to fund LOV premi-
ums, college coaches have noted that use of SAF funds allows institutions to retain
professionally bound elite student-athletes for additional season). See also Lens &
Lens, supra note 38, at 163 (discussing negative ramifications of using SAF to pay R
for insurance premiums).
63. See Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 163–64. R
64. Id. at 162 n.171 (citing Darren Rovell, Georgia Paid to Insure Todd Gurley,
ESPN (Oct. 12, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/
id/11682691/georgia-bulldogs-paid-more [https://perma.cc/KA4X-6E9X]). See
also William W. Berry III, Employee-Athletes, Antitrust, and the Future of College Sports,
28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 253 (2017) (noting that men’s college basketball and
football have become billion dollar industries).
65. See, e.g., Darren Rovell, College Football Insurance Policies Are Big—but Com-
plex—Business, ESPN (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/
story/_/id/17328541/college-football-insurance-policies-big-complicated-business
[https://perma.cc/N8UG-366H]. But see Darren Rovell, Jake Butt to Collect on Loss-
of-Value Policy Following Torn ACL, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2017), http://www.espn.com/
nfl/draft2017/story/_/id/19271765/jake-butt-collecting-loss-value-policy-reach-2-
million [https://perma.cc/2MNH-ESCQ] (reporting that Jake Butt (University of
Michigan (“UM”)), Ifo Ekpre-Olomu (University of Oregon) and Jaylon Smith
(University of Notre Dame (“ND”)) all reportedly have collected on LOV insur-
ance policies after falling in professional draft due to injuries).
66. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 54. See also Lee v. Certain Underwrit- R
ers at Lloyd’s London, 2:15-cv-01614-ODW-JC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015); Breslin v.
Amtrust at Lloyd’s Ltd., 2:15-cv-00330-R-AS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015); Breslin v.
Univ. of S. Cal., No. BC592870 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2015).
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Wartman-White, filed a lawsuit against International Specialty In-
surance Co., claiming the insurance provider reneged on a disabil-
ity policy after a knee injury caused him to drop from NFL draft
contention altogether.67  Due to the questionable payout history
and mounting litigation surrounding LOV policies, the NCAA has
purposefully avoided offering LOV insurance through its ESDI pro-
gram, instead leaving coverage accessibility solely to private
insurers.68
Even amid mounting legal claims, elite student-athletes con-
tinue to secure both LOV and ESDI insurance policies to help pro-
tect against risk of injury that could end their professional careers
or impact their draft stock.  For programs such as Clemson, Texas
A&M, and Florida State University that have the financial means to
purchase policies on behalf of their star athletes, exercising this op-
tion better secures institutions’ retention of elite players for an ad-
ditional season.69
One question resonating from the spectrum of universities us-
ing the SAF to cover ESDI and LOV insurance premiums is whether
any resulting payouts are taxable as income to the student-athlete.
Neither the IRC nor Treas. Regs. specifically address the tax conse-
quences of insurance policy payouts received when the premiums
are paid for by non-employers on behalf of beneficiaries in general.
Further, to date there is no published IRS Revenue Ruling address-
ing the taxability of payouts when student-athletes are listed as the
beneficiaries of policies purchased by their universities.  Thus, one
can only speculate how the IRS will treat these types of payouts.  To
address this inquiry, it is helpful to understand the broader scope of
federal tax rules encompassing insurance policy payouts.  The fol-
lowing section provides a brief analysis of the taxation of disability
income insurance benefits in the United States.
III. DISABILITY INSURANCE PLANS AND THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Understanding the umbrella of federal tax law as applies to dis-
ability insurance plans is an important step in analyzing the taxabil-
ity of ESDI and LOV insurance policy payouts.  Although there are
prescribed benefits to purchasing disability insurance policies, it is
essential to address the tax implications that could arise following a
67. See Whartman v. Int’l Specialty Ins., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00871-MEM (M.D.
Pa., May 17, 2017).
68. See Kain et al., supra note 13, at 233. R
69. See Tracy, supra note 4. R
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benefit payout.  Generally, the tax impact on disability benefits
comes down to one main question: who pays the cost of the
premium?70
The IRC and accompanying Treas. Regs. do provide some gui-
dance with respect to the taxability of insurance policy benefits.  As
a starting point for assessing the imposition of federal taxation, tax-
payers must first determine the amount of their gross income.71
The term ‘gross income’ includes “all income from whatever source
derived,” including compensation for services rendered for fringe
benefits.72  The IRS includes employer-provided accident and
health benefits within the spectrum of fringe benefits, although cer-
tain exclusions apply.73
In 1943, following the initiation of health insurance coverage
in the United States, the IRS ruled that employees were not re-
quired to include the value of health insurance premiums paid for
by their employers in their taxable income.74  Congress later codi-
fied this decision with the addition of IRC § 106, which allows an
employee to exclude from their gross income the cost of the pre-
mium paid for accident or health coverage when their employer is
the party that pays the premium.75  As a result, an employer can
provide any health insurance it chooses without including the costs
associated with the insurance in the employee’s income, while also
allowing the employer to deduct the cost of health insurance from
their own federal income tax base.76  This favorable codification ul-
70. How Taxes Can Impact the Benefits You Choose, PRINCIPAL FIN. SERVS., INC.,
https://secure02.principal.com/publicvsupply/GetFile?fm=GP58784&ty=VOP&
EXT=.VOP [https://perma.cc/A5RA-QSFY] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
71. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (2012). See also Jonathan Barry Forman &
Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725,
731 (2015) (denoting gross income as the starting point for calculating the federal
income tax).
72. § 61(a)(1). See also DEP’T OF TREAS.: IRS, PUBL’N 15-B, EMPLOYER’S TAX
GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS 5 (2018) [hereinafter IRS, Publ’n 15-B], available at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV3U-QKLK].  A
fringe benefit is a form of pay for the performance of services, and includes items
such as an employer-provided automobile, a flight on an employer-provided air-
craft, and an employer-provided membership in a country club.  Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-21(a)(3) (2017).
73. See IRS, Publ’n 15-B, supra note 72. See also 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1). R
74. See Richard L. Kaplan & Dawson J. Price, Change and Continuity in Fringe
Benefit Taxation: Seeking Sense and Sensibility, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 292
(2014–2015). See also SPEC. RUL. 433 STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. CCH 6587 (Nov.
24, 1943).
75. See 26 U.S.C. § 106(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1.
76. See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility?  Health Savings
Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 543–44
(2005). See also 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1).
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timately led to the development of widespread health insurance
policies across the nation, as well as the predominant practice of
employees participating in employer-sponsored insurance plans.77
Another provision that excludes the taxation of health benefits
is IRC § 104.78  Section 104 exempts from gross income damages
received due to personal injuries, unless those amounts are either
paid for by an employer or are attributable to pre-tax employee
contributions.79  The key to understanding the foundation of IRC
§ 104 is identifying who pays for the coverage—the individual or
their employer.  Thus, self-employed persons and those who pay for
health insurance in an individual capacity qualify for the more
favorable tax treatment under IRC § 104, while distributions made
from policies paid for by an employer do not qualify for the tax
exclusion.80
Treas. Reg. section 1.410(b)-9 only generically defines the term
‘employer’ as “the employer maintaining the plan,” making it un-
clear as to who qualifies as an employer for IRC § 104 purposes in
the first place.81  However, if the sole contributor to an accident or
health insurance policy is identified as an employer (however de-
fined), or is the sole purchaser of the policy paid for on behalf of
their employees, the tax exclusion allowed under IRC § 104 is un-
available.82  For instance, if an identified employer contributes $1X
per month to a disability plan and an employee later becomes dis-
abled, receiving $3X per month under the terms of the insurance
policy, the entire $3X per month must be included in the individ-
ual’s gross income under IRC § 104 because the employer was the
sole contributor to the plan.83
77. See Kaplan & Price, supra note 74, at 293. R
78. See 26. U.S.C. § 104.
79. See id. § 104(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(d); Robert W. Wood, Are
Insurance Bad Faith Recoveries Taxable?, 53 ARIZ. ATT’Y 26, 30 (2017).  The exclusion
is premised on the requirement that coverage be purchased using after-tax dollars.
‘After-tax dollars’ is defined as the amount of money that an individual “has left
over after all federal, state and withholding taxes have been deducted from taxable
income.” After-Tax Income, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/
aftertaxincome.asp?lgl=myfinance-layout-no-ads [https://perma.cc/4TXB-PWAJ]
(last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
80. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9.
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(d).  If the employer and their employees each con-
tribute to a fund or purchase insurance which pays accident or health benefits to
employees, IRC § 104(a)(3) does not apply to amounts received by employees to
the extent that such amounts are attributable to the employer’s contributions. Id.
83. Although the payout benefit is taxable to the employee in this instance, it
should be noted that the cost of health care is less expensive for taxpayers when it
is provided through their employer because it is paid with pre-tax dollars. See
15
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Although amounts paid for by or on behalf of an employer for
personal injury or sickness are not excludable from the employee’s
gross income under IRC § 104, they may be excludable under IRC
§ 105.84  Section 105 reiterates the general rule that any amounts
received by an employee through an employer-sponsored health or
accident plan for personal injury are includable in the employee’s
gross income.85  Receipt of disability payouts is therefore included
in the gross income of an employee if their employer paid for all or
part of the coverage premium on behalf of the injured person.86
However, an important exclusion to this provision exists within IRC
§ 105(b) and (c), which allows taxpayers to exclude benefits they
receive from employer financed accident or health plans for pur-
poses of medical care and “permanent loss or loss of use of a mem-
ber or function of the body” (i.e. disability) payments.87
Treas. Reg. section 1.105-1 provides several examples to illus-
trate the taxability of amounts attributable to employer contribu-
tions under IRC § 105.88  Outside the parameters of the IRC
§ 105(b) and (c) exclusions, if an employer maintains an accident
or health plan where employees make no contributions to the plan
and all benefits are paid by the employer (referred to as a noncon-
tributory plan), any amounts received under such plan are includ-
able in the employees’ gross income.89  Alternatively, if the annual
premium for employee X is $24, of which $16 is paid by the em-
ployer, then 16/24 (or two-thirds) of all amounts received by X
under the policy are subject to IRC § 105(a), while 8/24 (or one
third) of the remaining amounts received are excludable from X’s
gross income under IRC § 104(a)(3).90
Analyzing the taxability of disability insurance payouts under
the entire framework of IRC §§ 104, 105, and 106 also requires an
identification of whether insurance premiums are paid with pre-tax
or post-tax dollars.91  If a taxpayer pays for the premium of a disabil-
ity insurance policy using after-tax dollars, any benefits received are
Daniela De La Torre, Comment, The Affordable Care Act: The Replacement for the Em-
ployer Sponsored Health Insurance Tax Exclusion, 18 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (2016).  Fur-
ther note that “X” in the textual example represents any number of zeros.
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(d). See generally 26 U.S.C. § 105.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 105(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(a).
86. 26 U.S.C. § 105(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(b)–(c).
87. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c). See also id. § 105(b).  The term “medical care” is de-
fined in 26 U.S.C. § 213(d).
88. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1.
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(b), Example 1.
90. See id. § 1.105-1(d)(1).
91. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3).
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excludable from gross income.92  Instead, if a taxpayer pays for the
premium using pre-tax dollars, any benefits received are taxable.93
Finally, if the cost of the insurance premium is split between an
employer and employee, the portion of the benefit received relat-
ing to the employer-contribution will be taxable, while the tax con-
sequences of the share of the benefit received relating to the
employee-contribution will depend on whether the premium was
paid using pre-tax or after-tax dollars.94  Thus, in a hypothetical sce-
nario where an employer contributes 60% towards an accident or
health insurance policy premium and employee X contributes 40%,
$60 of any $100 benefit received will be includable in the em-
ployee’s gross income.95  If employee X contributed to the pre-
mium using pre-tax dollars, the remaining $40 is includable in
gross income.  However, if employee X contributed to the premium
using after-tax dollars, then the $40 will be tax-free.
The following chart attempts to summarize the general taxabil-
ity of disability benefit rules as applicable under the IRC:96
92. See id.
93. See id.  Pre-tax dollars refers to the scenario where deductions are taken
off an individual’s gross income before income taxes are paid, resulting in taxes
being calculated at a reduced salary. See, e.g., What Does It Mean When You Have Pre-
Tax Dollar Insurance Premiums Deducted from Your Pay, EXTENSION (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://articles.extension.org/pages/42694/what-does-it-mean-when-you-have-pre-
tax-dollar-health-insurance-premiums-deducted-from-your-pay [https://perma.cc/
6E76-MWLC] (“When you pay for benefits such as health insurance with pre-tax
(also called before-tax) dollars, the deductions are taken off your gross income
before income taxes are paid.  Taxes are then calculated on the reduced salary
amount.  Having pre-tax dollar deductions results in less income tax paid than
would otherwise be the case.”).
94. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(c)(1) (“In the case of
amounts received by an employee through an accident or health plan which is
financed partially by his employer and partially by contributions of the employee,
section 105(a) applies to the extent that such amounts are attributable to contribu-
tions of the employer which were not includible in the employee’s gross income.”).
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(c)(1).
96. See STANDARD INS. CO., GUIDE TO TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE DISABILITY BENE-
FITS 2 available at https://www.standard.com/eforms/8461.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8L7U-VR2U] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
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Taxability of
Benefit
Payor of the Pre- or Post- Received by Percent of Benefit
Premium Tax Dollars Taxpayer Taxable to Taxpayer
Employer ——— Taxable 100%
Split Between After-Tax Taxable % of premium
Employer & Dollars contributed by
Employee (Employee) Employer
(% of premium
contributed by
employee is tax-free)
Split Between Pre-Tax Taxable 100%
Employer & Dollars
Employee (Employee)
Individual After-Tax Not Taxable 0%
Dollars
Individual Pre-Tax Taxable 100%
Dollars
Based on the rules as outlined in the IRC and Treas. Regs. re-
garding the taxability of disability insurance plans, a legitimate
question is how the IRS might categorize benefits received by stu-
dent-athletes under ESDI or LOV insurance policy payouts.  To
date, the IRS has been reluctant to impose taxes on student-athletes
and, to a great degree, on the college sports industry in general.97
There is also no question that college athletic programs have a
vested interest in protecting elite student-athletes and keeping
them on the amateur playing field to help bolster program reve-
nue.  Analyzing the taxability of ESDI and LOV insurance premium
payouts could prompt broader policy discussions among academic
scholars in what is currently an under-theorized legal area.  There-
fore, a discussion regarding the IRS’s historical stance on taxing
student-athletes and the college sports industry, the national dialog
over whether student-athletes should be paid to play, and the over-
lying quandary surrounding the movement toward the professional-
ization of college sports is helpful in gauging future policy solutions
for taxing ESDI and LOV payouts.
97. See KOSKINEN, supra note 11. R
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IV. TAX POLICY IN THE BILLION DOLLAR
COLLEGE SPORTS INDUSTRY
Academic literature has suggested that there can be “[n]othing
. . . more professional than big-time college football and basketball
teams.”98  This sentiment is not without merit—it is estimated that
the college sports industry generates more than $11 billion in reve-
nue annually based on “ticket sales, merchandise, sponsorships,
and broadcasting rights.”99  Even the NCAA, a non-profit organiza-
tion under the federal tax laws, earned almost $1 billion in revenue
during its 2014 fiscal year.100  However, the basic tenet of the NCAA
continues to be the promotion and preservation of amateurism in
college sports.101  Thus, any movement toward professionalization
at the collegiate level would be hugely inconsistent with the ideal of
the “student-athlete.”102
Still, the debate over the movement to professionalize the col-
lege sports industry has gained traction in the past decade, prompt-
ing a volume of academic scholars weighing in on the pay-for-play
model.103  Simultaneously, recent litigation encompassing anticom-
98. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionaliza-
tion of College Athletics, 1 UTAH L. REV. 35, 35 (1987).
99. See Marc Edelman, From Student-Athletes to Employee-Athletes: Why a “Pay for
Play” Model of College Sports Would Not Necessarily Make Educational Scholarships Taxa-
ble, 58 B.C.L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2017); Kyle Obly, It Is Time for NCAA Student-Athletes
to Be Paid, GAMBIT (Oct. 3, 2017), http://auroragambit.wixsite.com/gambit/single-
post/2017/10/03/It-is-time-for-NCAA-student-athletes-to-be-paid [https://perma
.cc/DCW8-EATD] (noting the reasoning behind the $11 billion estimate).
100. See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014,
USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/
2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-2014-1-billion-revenue/70161386/ [https://
perma.cc/H6XC-86QQ].
101. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 2.9 (“The Principle R
of Amateurism”).
102. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 36. R
103. See, e.g., Christian Dennie, He Shoots, He Scores: An Analysis of O’Bannon v.
NCAA on Appeal and the Future of Intercollegiate Sports, 93 N.C.L. REV. 90 (2015) (pos-
turing arguments about future of college sports following O’Bannon case); Roger
M. Groves, A Solution for the Pay for Play Dilemma of College Athletes: A Novel Compensa-
tion Structure Tethered to Amateurism and Education, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L.
101 (2016) (offering the creation of new NCAA rules that are consistent with the
O’Bannon decision); Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, Northwestern,
O’Bannon, and the Future: Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified Scholarships, 49
AKRON L. REV. 771 (2016) (analyzing the possibility of taxing qualified scholarships
should student-athletes be deemed employees of their universities); Josephine R.
Potuto et al., What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treat-
ment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879 (2014) (analyzing the movement from
amateurism to professionalism in college sports); Joseph Davison, Note, Throwing
the Flag on Pay-for-Play: The O’Bannon Ruling and the Future of Paid Student-Athletes, 11
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 155 (2015) (analyzing the impact of recent litigation on
the premise of amateurism in college sports).
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petitive behaviors, unionization efforts, and antitrust lawsuits have
further capitalized on the running campaign that student-athletes
should be given the opportunity to rise above their current amateur
status.104  Certainly, the metamorphosis from “amateur” athletics
into a more professional-yet-collegiate model would not occur with-
out considering the possible tax ramifications.105
As mentioned, the IRS has been reluctant to impose income
taxes on student-athletes with respect to their athletic scholarships,
more formally known as athletic “grants-in-aid.”106  Further, the col-
lege sports industry in general has enjoyed strikingly favorable tax
positions over the past decades due to the tax-exempt status of col-
leges, athletic departments, and the NCAA itself.107  Such historical
protection could play an important role in identifying the potential
tax effects of ESDI and LOV insurance policy payouts moving
forward.
In conjunction, a slew of court decisions over the past sixty
years have generally supported the notion that student-athletes are
not yet considered employees of their institutions.108  This distinc-
tion could also play a part in understanding the application of the
IRC and Treas. Regs. to disability insurance policy payouts received
by student-athletes.  As such, this section provides a brief synopsis of
104. For examples of litigation concerning anticompetivie behavior, see
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), and In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126
(N.D. Cal. 2014).  For an example of unionization efforts, see Nw. Univ. Employer
& Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 13-RC-121359 (N.L.R.B.) (Mar. 26, 2014), rev. dis-
missed Nw. Univ. Employer & College Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 NLRB No. 167, 2-
3, (Aug. 17, 2015).  In February 2017, the NCAA and 11 major athletic conferences
agreed to pay $208.7 million to settle a federal class-action lawsuit filed by former
college athletes who claimed the value of their scholarships was illegally capped.
See Jon Solomon, NCAA, Conferences Agree to Pay $208.7 Million in Cost of Attendance
Settlement, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/college-foot
ball/news/ncaa-conferences-agree-to-pay-208-7-million-in-cost-of-attendance-settle
ment/ [https://perma.cc/M65F-CUD2].
105. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 37 (noting that the creation of an openly R
professional athletic team would have federal income tax consequences). See also
Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Esptein, “Show Me the Money!”—Analyzing the Poten-
tial State Tax Implications of Paying Student-Athletes, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13
(2014) (documenting potential state tax implications of paying student-athletes).
106. See Gary C. Randall, Athletic Scholarship and Taxes: Or a Touchdown in
Taxes, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 297, 299 (1972).
107. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 51 (noting that college sports hold “an ex- R
alted tax position”). See also William A. Drennan, Taxing Commercial Sponsorships of
College Athletics: A Balanced Approach, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1353, 1373 (2012) (discussing
that tax law has treated nonprofit athletic organizations and college athletic pro-
grams as being “integral part[s] of the tax-exempt college”).
108. For further discussion of court decisions regarding student-athletes’ sta-
tus (or lack thereof) as employees, see infra notes 157–163.
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(a) the IRS’s historical reluctance to impose taxes on student-ath-
letes and the college sports industry in general, and (b) the mount-
ing litigation to characterize big-time college sports as professional
rather than amateur.
A. IRS’s Historical Reluctance to Tax the
College Sports Industry
In 1954, Congress enacted IRC § 117 which governs the rules
pertaining to taxing qualified scholarships.109  A qualified scholar-
ship includes “amount[s] received by an individual as a scholarship
or fellowship grant” so long as the funds are “used for qualified
tuition and related expenses.”110  Section 117 allows that any
amount received as a qualified scholarship by an individual is ex-
cludable from gross income if that individual is a candidate for a
degree at a qualified educational organization.111  In general, quali-
fied scholarships do not include amounts for incidental expenses
including room, board, travel, and research.112
The IRC § 117 exclusion does not apply to amounts represent-
ing payments for teaching, research, or other services required as a
condition of a student’s scholarship.113  The U.S. Supreme Court
held that any quid pro quo condition required in exchange for the
receipt of scholarship or grant funds triggers a taxable event.114  In
the landmark case Bingler v. Johnson,115 two Ph.D. students partici-
pated in a fellowship program that required both work-study and
research obligations in exchange for receiving stipends.116  The
Court, finding these stipends to be taxable, held that students who
provide services in exchange for scholarship funds must include
such amounts in their gross income.117
109. See 26 U.S.C. § 117. See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at R
782.
110. 26 U.S.C. § 117(b)(1). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a).  Qualified tui-
tion and related expenses include “tuition . . . fees, books, supplies, and equip-
ment” that are required in the specified course of instruction. 26 U.S.C.
§ 117(b)(2)(A)–(B).
111. See 26 U.S.C. § 117.  See also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1.
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-5(c)(1)(ii).
113. 26 U.S.C. § 117(c)(1).
114. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 757–58 (1969).
115. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
116. See id. at 742–44.
117. See id. at 758 n.32 (finding that payments cannot be scholarships “where
the recipient receives money, and in return provides a quid pro quo”).
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The application of IRC § 117 has also been analyzed by the
U.S. Tax Court multiple times.118  In Bonn v. Commissioner,119 the
court held that funds received by a physician in exchange for ser-
vices rendered to a Veterans Administration hospital under a fel-
lowship program constituted taxable compensation for services
rather than a fellowship grant.120  Later, in Zolnay v. Commis-
sioner,121 the U.S. Tax Court held that monthly payments received
by a Ph.D. candidate who worked forty hours a week as a research
assistant for the Ohio State University while being subject to super-
vision, planned schedules, and regular progress reports were taxa-
ble as compensation for services rendered rather than a fellowship
excludable under IRC § 117.122  In Proskey v. Commissioner,123 the
Tax Court sustained a decision that a stipend received by a resident
physician in exchange for his supervisory role over medical stu-
dents, interns, and residents constituted taxable compensation for
services rendered to the hospital.124
In contrast, in Smith v. Commissioner,125 the Tax Court found
that funds received by a graduate assistant while completing her
master’s degree constituted a scholarship or fellowship grant.126
This case is distinguishable from the court’s prior cases in that the
petitioner only studied during the funding period; the university
granting the funds received no direct benefit from her research nor
imposed any requirement that she teach or conduct university re-
search projects or publish any findings during the period at
issue.127
118. See, e.g., Smith v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1348 (1986); Proskey v.
Comm’r, 51 T.C. 918 (1969); Zolnay v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 389, 399 (1968); Bonn v.
Comm’r, 34 T.C. 64 (1960).
119. 34 T.C. 64 (1960).
120. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 787–88. See also Bonn, 34 R
T.C. at 64–66, 73 (finding that the Veterans Administration hospital existed prima-
rily for patient care, and that the fellowship program’s adoption of a trainee pro-
gram—which petitioner participated in—was incidental to the care and treatment
of patients).
121. 49 T.C. 389 (1968).
122. Id. at 397–99.
123. 51 T.C. 918 (1969).
124. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 788. See also Proskey, 51 R
T.C. at 919–22 (finding as compensation for employment services—not a fellow-
ship grant—when petitioner received annual stipends during his medical resi-
dency based on the number of years of service he provided as a resident.  In
return, petitioner supervised medical students, interns, and assistant residents.
The U.S. Tax Court upheld this decision).
125. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1348 (1986).
126. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 789. See also Smith, 51 R
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1348.
127. Smith, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1350.
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court and Tax Court have applied
the quid pro quo condition within the spectrum of research assist-
ants and fellowship recipients for IRC § 117 purposes, such adher-
ence has historically been dealt with differently for student-athletes
receiving qualified scholarships.128  In 1977, the IRS issued Reve-
nue Ruling 77-263, which excludes athletic scholarships from the
strict quid pro quo limitation of IRC § 117(c) because “the benefit to
the university was incidental and the primary purpose of collegiate
sports was educational.”129  However, Revenue Ruling 77-263 is un-
clear and confusing.  For example, it does impose the restriction
that universities may not require student-athletes to participate in
sports or other activities as a condition of receiving scholarship
funds, and that universities may not cancel scholarships on the basis
of student-athletes not participating in their sports.130  In reality,
when a student-athlete receives an athletic scholarship from an in-
stitution, it is a naturally expected, outright condition that the stu-
dent-athlete participate in the sport itself unless the student-athlete
voluntarily withdraws from the sport for personal reasons, provides
fraudulent information to the school, engages in “serious miscon-
duct,” or violates a condition of the financial aid agreement or pol-
icy of the school.131  The 1977 Revenue Ruling further provides
that the value of an athletic scholarship “may not exceed expenses
for tuition, fees, room, board and necessary supplies . . . .”132  Such
language provides a broader exclusion than that generally afforded
by the applicable Section 117 Treas. Reg. which does not allow for
the exclusion of room and board costs from a scholarship recipi-
ent’s gross income.133
Forty years later, the IRS has yet to challenge or re-examine its
own tax treatment of athletic scholarships.134  The only documenta-
128. See Jake Linford, The Kidney Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships
Can Provide Financial Incentives for Kidney Donation While Preserving Altruistic Meaning,
2 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 265, 302 (2009).
129. See Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47, 1977 WL 43568 (1977); Justin More-
house, When Play Becomes Work: Are College Athletes Employees?, TAX ANALYSTS (Sept.
22, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/when-play-becomes-work-are-col-
lege-athletes-employees [https://perma.cc/6B8F-XXCE].
130. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977 WL 43568, at *1.
131. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 15.3.5.1 (“Reduction, R
Cancellation or Nonrenewal Permitted”).
132. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977 WL 43568, at *1.  This “cap” enunciated by the
1977 Revenue Ruling is not entirely consistent given the holding in the noteworthy
2015 court decision in O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015) that now allows cost of attendance (“COA”) payments to be paid to
student-athletes above their athletic scholarships, discussed further infra.
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-5(c)(1)(ii).
134. See Morehouse, supra note 129. R
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tion to come forward since the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-263
regarding the federal tax treatment of athletic grants-in-aid is a
2014 letter from then IRS Commissioner, John A. Koskinen, to Sen-
ator Richard Burr (R-NC) rearticulating the agency’s stance that
athletic scholarships qualify for exclusion from gross income
outside the exact spectrum of quid pro quo.135  Legal scholars and
commentators have argued that a quid pro quo relationship does in
fact exist between universities and their student-athletes, but the
IRS has not moved to participate in this discussion.136  Thus, unless
there is a clear-cut change in IRS policy, it remains stable that stu-
dent-athletes will continue to enjoy highly favorable tax treatment
by the IRS with respect to their scholarship funds moving forward
and that athletic scholarships will continue to be non-taxable at the
federal level.
Similarly, the college athletics arena in general has received
amicable tax treatment by the IRS.  Universities do “not pay federal
tax on tuition and other income attributable to its educational ac-
tivities.”137  Instead, colleges are taxed only on their unrelated busi-
ness income (“UBI”), which is income from a trade or business that
is carried on regularly, but is not “substantially related” to the insti-
tution’s primary purpose.138  As the primary purpose of a university
is to educate students, institutions have successfully maintained
their tax-exempt statuses with regard to their college athletic pro-
135. See KOSKINEN, supra note 11. R
136. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 106 at 299–309 (1972) (arguing that athletic
scholarships should be taxable under the Internal Revenue Code); Adam Hoe-
flich, Note, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: A Problem of Consistency, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 581 (1991) (examining the quid pro quo application to athletic scholar-
ships); Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal &
Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 55, 74 (2000) (noting that student-
athletes are required to perform athletic services in exchange for scholarship
money); and Daniel Nestel, Note, Athletic scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between
the University and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST. L. J. 1401, 1413 (1992) (providing
that athletic scholarships create a quid pro quo relationship).
137. Jensen, supra note 98, at 44. But see TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. 1, R
115th Cong. (2017–2018), which became Public Law No. 115-97 on Dec. 22, 2017.
H.R. 1 will impact higher education, to include imposing a 21% excise tax on non-
profit organization salaries in excess of $1 million dollars per year if those salaries
belong to any of the organization’s five highest paid employees, including college
football coaches. Id.
138. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 45, 47.  An activity is an unrelated business R
(and thus subject to the unrelated business income tax) if it is: (1) a trade or
business, (2) regularly carried on, and (3) not substantially related to the institu-
tion’s exempt purpose. Id. at 45 (citing 26 U.S.C § 512(a)(1)). See also Jeff K.
Brown, Issues Facing College Athletics: Compensation for the Student-Athlete: Preservation
of Amateurism, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 150 (1996). See generally 26 U.S.C.
§§ 511(a); 513(a).
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grams.139  In 1976, Congress passed an amendment to IRC
§ 501(c), which declared the fostering of “national or international
amateur sports competition” as a charitable purpose.140  Later, in
1983, the Tenth Circuit upheld a U.S. Tax Court decision finding
that “the furtherance of recreational and amateur sports” continues
to be a charitable activity.141
However, one year after Congress’s amendment to the IRC, the
IRS attempted to impose a tax on revenue from radio and broad-
casting rights from college bowl games based on the concept that
such revenue was UBI.142  This divisive position was met with heavy
opposition, and following intense protests, the IRS reversed its
stance by issuing numerous technical advice memoranda stating it
would not impose a UBI tax on revenue from broadcasting rights as
it determined there is “no meaningful distinction between exhibit-
ing the game in person to 100,000 people and exhibiting the game
on television to a much larger audience.”143  The IRS further high-
lighted the interconnection between college athletics and educa-
tion, noting, “[a]n audience for a game may contribute importantly
to the education of the student-athlete . . . and to the education of
the student body and the community at large . . . .”144
In 1991, the IRS again published a highly-debated technical
advice memorandum (referred to as the “Mobil Cotton Bowl Let-
ter”), imposing a tax on corporate sponsorship income received by
tax-exempt organizations.145  The memorandum stemmed from the
IRS’s interest in sponsorship payments received by the Cotton Bowl
139. See Christopher W. Haden, Foul! The Exploitation of the Student-Athlete: Stu-
dent-Athletes Deserve Compensation for Their Play in the College Athletic Arena, 30 J.L. &
EDUC. 673, 678 (2001).
140. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520,
1730 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)).
141. Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Comm’r, 696 F.2d 757, 762 (10th Cir.
1982).
142. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 51 (citing Bruce R. Hopkins, THE LAW OF R
TAX-EXEMPT ORGS., APP. A., 887–88 (6th ed. 1992)).  The subject of the subsequent
IRS technical advice memorandum was the Cotton Bowl, hosted by the Cotton
Bowl Athletic Association. See Nathan Wirtschafter, Comment, Fourth Quarter
Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1465,
1472–73 (1994).
143. Id. (citing I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002; 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978);
78-51-006).  Two similar Revenue Rulings were also published in 1980. See Rev.
Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194, 1980 WL 130283 (1980); Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B.
195 (1980).
144. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978). See also Brown, supra
note 138, at 151. R
145. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991).  The Technical
Advice Memoranda was primarily directed at the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association.
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Athletic Association from Mobil Corporation, one of its major cor-
porate sponsors.146  Following a barrage of letters to the IRS and
Congressional lobbying after the publication of the memorandum,
in 1993, the IRS once again changed its stance, issuing proposed
Treas. Regs. granting significant leniency to corporate
sponsorship147
Similar to colleges and universities, the NCAA also garners
great tax immunity.148  With a membership exceeding 1,100 institu-
tions, even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that virtually all
public and private universities which conduct major athletic pro-
grams in the U.S. belong to the NCAA.149  Like private universities,
the NCAA relies on its tax-exempt status as an IRC § 501(c)(3) or-
ganization to maintain its favorable tax treatment with the IRS.150
For years academic scholars have questioned how a billion dollar
entity can continue to be recognized as a tax-exempt organiza-
tion.151  Even Congress in 2006 demanded that the NCAA justify its
position as a not-for-profit organization.152  Still, to date the NCAA
has successfully defended its favorable tax status.153
The above examples paint a history of the IRS’s reluctance to
tax student-athletes on their grants-in-aid, and the successful efforts
by the college sports industry to maintain generally favorable tax
treatment.  Such rich history could ultimately influence the IRS’s
decision as to whether it should even consider taxing ESDI and
LOV insurance policy payouts made to injured student-athletes in
the future.  Still, the growing movement to professionalize college
sports in the U.S. continues to gain traction and attention.  This
movement, which exploded in the media in recent years due to
146. See Frank James Vari, The Unrelated Business Income Tax and Its Effect upon
Collegiate Athletics, 9 AKRON TAX J. 111, 111 (1992).
147. See Wirtschafter, supra note 142, at 1466–67. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. R
§ 1.513-4 (1983).
148. See John D. Columbo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 133 (2010).
149. See W. Burlett Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA.
J. SPORTS & L. 1, 6 (2000) (citing NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999); NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988)).
150. See Columbo, supra note 148, at 113. R
151. See, e.g., Amy C. McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 (2008);
Amanda Pintaro, Is the NCAA Fulfilling Its Tax-Exempt Status?, ILL. BUS. L.J. (2010).
152. See Columbo, supra note 148, at 110. R
153. See Elia Powers, The NCAA Responds, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 16, 2006),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/16/ncaa [https://perma.cc/
894T-XYCY] (referencing to the twenty-five page response drafted by Myles Brand,
then-President of the NCAA) to Capitol Hill defending the NCAA’s status as a tax-
exempt organization).
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multiple legal actions being filed by former and current student-
athletes, could ultimately prompt a closer examination by the IRS
as to the taxability of the college sports industry as a whole.  Thus, a
brief history of the evolution of attempts to professionalize college
sports by characterizing student-athletes as employees and their uni-
versities as employers should be considered when evaluating how the
IRS could treat ESDI and LOV payouts moving forward.
B. The Mounting Litigation to Professionalize College Athletics
The conflict that exists between the educational archetype that
embraces the “student” in the NCAA’s ideal of student-athlete, and
the realities of college football and basketball is not a recent anom-
aly.154  Studies have found that a student-athlete’s personal salient
identity as being identified as an athlete first during their college
career is largely influenced by the proportion of time spent with
coaches, teammates, and others in the athletic arena.155  Addition-
ally, the increasing gap between student-athletes and the educa-
tional side of their institutions stems from the enormous revenue
that universities generate from their athletic departments.156  The
growing divide has prompted litigation for more than six decades
querying whether student-athletes should be treated as employees
of their universities.157
The earliest cases addressing the employer-employee charac-
terization of student-athletes arose almost entirely within the con-
text of state workers’ compensation claims.158  In University of Denver
v. Nemeth,159 a Colorado court held that a college football player
who was also employed and compensated by the university in ex-
change for his participation on the football team qualified for work-
154. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 39. R
155. See Lydia F. Bell, Examining Academic Role-Set Influence on the Student-Ath-
lete, J. ISSUES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 19, 22 (2009), http://csri-jiia.org/old/
documents/publications/special_issues/2009/sp_02_Making_of_the_Athlete-Stu-
dent.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9MZ-BFMV] (analyzing the role of salience in stu-
dent-athletes, and offering that a quarterback who becomes a campus hero after
leading a team to victory in a championship game may see ‘athlete’ as his most
salient identity at the close of the season).
156. See Jensen, supra note 98, at 41. R
157. See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953); State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indust. Accident Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957); Van
Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Taylor v.
Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E. 2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert denied, 192 S.E. 2d 197
(N.C. 1972); Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E. 2d 1170 (Ind.
1983); Coleman v. W. Michigan University, 336 N.W. 2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983);
and Waldrep v. Texas Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
158. See Epstein & Anderson, supra note 36, at 294. R
159. 257 P.2d. 423 (Colo. 1953).
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ers’ compensation after being injured during practice.160  Four
years later, however, the Supreme Court of Colorado denied work-
ers’ compensation benefits to the widow of player who died after
suffering an injury during a football game, finding no contractual
obligation to play football between the player and university.161
Then, more than two decades later, in Coleman v. Western Michigan
University,162 the Michigan Court of Appeals found no employment
contract existed between a university and student-athlete which
would rise to the level of being eligible for workers’
compensation.163
Some states have specifically rejected the characterization of
student-athletes as employees.164  In Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insur-
ance Ass’n,165 the Texas Court of Appeals emphasized that there was
no intent on the part of Texas Christian University or Kent Waldrep
that his scholarship constitute payment for his football services or
that any employment relationship existed.166  Similarly, in the 1983
case Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees,167 the Indi-
ana court ruled that no employment relationship existed between a
football player and his university.168
160. See id. at 430.
161. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288, 290
(Colo. 1957).  The court technically did not overturn the Nemeth decision four
years earlier, but rather distinguished Nemeth by finding that his (Nemeth’s) em-
ployment “depended wholly on his playing football and it is clear that if he failed
to perform as a football player he would lose the job provided for him by the
University.” Id.
162. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
163. See id. at 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).  In 1979, the hearing referee denied
compensation to Coleman, noting he “was not an employee of defendant” but
instead “a scholarship-student athlete.” Id. at 225.  The Court of Appeals affirmed
and rejected the argument that college football is integral to a university’s primary
business of education and research. Id. at 227.
164. See State Comp. Ins. Fund, 314 P.2d at 574; Rensing v. Ind. St. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983) (holding no evidence of an employer-
employee relationship).
165. 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000).
166. See id. at 699–700 (emphasizing no intent on the part of Texas Christian
University (TCU) or football player Kent Waldrep that his athletic scholarship
should create an employer-employee relationship that would fall under workers’
compensation statutes).
167. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
168. See id. at 1175 (holding no evidence of an employer-employee relation-
ship amounting to workmen’s compensation for permanent total disability).  The
two outlying cases that have established employment within the context of student-
athlete qualifying for workers’ compensation did so based on facts substantiating
that the student-athletes were each separately employed by their universities
outside the scope of sports, and that such employment was required in order to
maintain their status on the football team. See Epstein & Anderson, supra note 36, R
at 294–95. See also Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963)
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In recent years, challenges about whether student-athletes
should be compensated as employees or, alternatively, for the use
of their names, images, and likenesses stem not from workers’ com-
pensation claims, but from antitrust and right-of-publicity argu-
ments.  In 2009, Sam Keller and Ed O’Bannon merged separately-
filed lawsuits into a unified suit against the NCAA, labeled the In re
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation.169  Keller,
O’Bannon, and other former and current Division I student-ath-
letes claimed that the characteristics of the players in the NCAA
Electronic Arts (“EA”) Sports’ video games mirrored theirs, thus vi-
olating their rights of publicity and image.170  The O’Bannon v.
NCAA171 lawsuit claimed the NCAA was violating antitrust law in
preventing student-athletes from capitalizing on their names and
likenesses.172
In 2014, Senior District Judge Claudia Wilken ruled in favor of
O’Bannon in his antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA.173  At the time,
Judge Wilken allowed for payment to student-athletes of up to
$5,000 in deferred compensation by NCAA schools, resulting in an
immediate appeal by the NCAA which remained adamant that stu-
dent-athletes should not be paid or characterized as employees.174
(holding that a college football player at California Polytechnic State University,
San Luis Obispo, could be the college’s ‘employee’ for workers’ compensation
purposes after the widow of a college football player killed in an airplane crash
following a football game sued under California law); Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth,
257 P.2d. 423 (Colo. 1953). But see Shephard v. Loy. Marymount Univ., 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (referencing Van Horn and offering that as a
direct result of that decision, California’s “Labor Code section 3352, subdivision
(k) excludes a student athlete receiving an athletic scholarship from the term
‘employee’”).
169. 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra
note 105, at 22. R
170. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724
F.3d at 1271–73. See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 105, at 22. R
171. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
172. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962–63. See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein,
supra note 103, at 778. R
173. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. Wilken’s ruling, though short-lived
by the appellate decision referenced infra, held that the NCAA could cap compen-
sation at $5,000 per year above the value of full college scholarships. Id.
174. See Tom Farrey, Ed O’Bannon: Ruling is Tip of Iceberg, ESPN (Aug. 10,
2014, 10:09 AM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11332816/ed-oban-
non-says-antitrust-ruling-only-beginning-change [https://perma.cc/H6ZJ-9KCF]
(noting that the O’Bannon decision is a significant start towards the outright rejec-
tion of the NCAA’s amateurism model). See also Rick Maese, O’Bannon v. NCAA
Ruling Could Set Up Larger Arguments over College Sports, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Aug.
9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/obannon-v-ncaa-rul-
ing- could-set-up-larger-arguments-over-college-sports-experts-say/2014/08/09/
5338ae4c-1fe2-11e4-9b6c-12e30cbe86a3_story.html (detailing that in the aftermath
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Wilken’s deci-
sion, in part, but rejected and vacated the part of her ruling al-
lowing schools to offer deferred compensation in exchange for the
use of players’ likenesses.175
Most recently, in 2017, former Ohio State University line-
backer, Chris Spielman, filed a similar lawsuit against IMG College,
LLC, Ohio State University, and others for unlawfully conspiring
under antitrust law to deny payment to current and former Ohio
State football players for the unlawful use of their names, images,
and likenesses.176  The complaint alleges that Honda corporate-
sponsored banners hung during home football games at the Buck-
eyes’ stadium depicted Spielman and other student-athletes who
never agreed to appear on the banners and were never paid for
such appearances.177  Spielman’s complaint demands that the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio enjoin Ohio State
and others from continuing to use players’ identities for profit with-
out negotiating these rights with players, and to compel the defend-
ants to pay monetary damages to former players for the historic use
of their images and likenesses.178
It also must be noted, however, that a 2014 ruling from Region
13 of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) involving a
unionization attempt by the Northwestern University football team
of the O’Bannon decision, the NCAA “has given no indication it is eager to em-
brace any form of pay-for-play model”).
175. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079 (vacating the district court’s judgment
(Wilken) and ordering a permanent injunction insofar as requiring the NCAA to
allow its member schools to pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred
compensation).
176. See Michael McCann, Chris Spielman’s Lawsuit Against Ohio State Could Set
Monumental Precedent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, https://www.si.com/college-football/
2017/07/16/chris-spielman-ncaa-ohio-state-football-img-college-ed-obannon-
honda-nike [https://perma.cc/F8Y3-YMDP] (July 16, 2017). See also Class Action
Complaint, Spielman v. IMG College, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00612-MHW-KAJ, 2017 WL
3015658 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2017).
177. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 176, at 8–9.  The complaint also R
alleges that Ohio State, in collaboration with Nike, produced “Legends of the Scar-
let and Gray” vintage Ohio State jerseys that depicted Spielman and other former
Ohio State athletes without providing compensation. Id. at 6.
178. Id. at 34.  Spielman’s case sets the groundwork for having a greater judi-
cial impact than even the O’Bannon case, which was denied certiorari on appeal
from the Ninth Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016.  Should it go to trial
and be appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, resulting in a possible con-
flict with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in O’Bannon, the U.S. Supreme Court may ulti-
mately be faced with a request for certiorari premised on a conflict of federal
antitrust law interpretation between circuits.  Although there is no guarantee that
the U.S. Supreme Court would grant certiorari on any grounds for appeal, the
Spielman filing provides the springboard for unified federal precedent to be estab-
lished in the area of antitrust law as applies to former and current student-athletes.
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which held that select student-athletes should be allowed to union-
ize under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) may have
been the most significant step forward—though short lived—in the
movement to characterize student-athletes as employees.179  That
decision and opinion by Hon. Peter Sung Ohr authoring that foot-
ball players at Northwestern should indeed be considered employ-
ees under the law and be allowed to vote to unionize was ultimately
overruled and vacated by the full NLRB, holding that the Region 13
NLRB did not have jurisdiction to hear the case from the outset.180
Then, in 2016, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Berger v.
NCAA,181 held that former track and field student-athletes at the
University of Pennsylvania were not employees and therefore not
covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the federal
minimum wage law.182
Each of these challenges, cases, and decisions—from early Col-
orado workers’ compensation to present—have helped shape the
debate over whether student-athletes should be paid or character-
ized as employees.  It is clear, however, that the judicial system has
thus far generally not conceded to the will of plaintiffs who claim
that student-athletes are employees of their institutions, per se.
This assessment, in conjunction with the NCAA’s firm adherence to
the fundamental principle of amateurism in college sports, pro-
179. Nw. Univ. Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 13-RC-121359
(N.L.R.B.) (Mar. 26, 2014). See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, Northwestern Univer-
sity, The University of Missouri, and the “Student-Athlete”: Mobilization Efforts and the
Future, 26 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 71, 94 (2016).  Regional Director, Peter Sung
Ohr, determined that grant-in-aid scholarship football players at Northwestern
University were ‘employees’ under Section 2(3) of the NLRA and could therefore
held a unionization election. Id.
180. Nw. Univ. Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167,
*7 (Aug. 17, 2015) (noting that even if it were to find that scholarship student-
athletes were employees, “it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert
jurisdiction,” because, due to the nature of NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivi-
sion (FBS) football and the fact that there are so few private universities who are
members, “it would not promote stability in labor relations to assert jurisdiction in
this case”).
181. 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21642 (7th Cir. 2016).
182. Id. at *1–*2 (referencing the relevant statutory framework throughout
beginning with 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., “Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938”).  The
Berger court stated, “Simply put, student-athletic ‘play’ is not ‘work,’ at least as the
term is used in the FLSA.  We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that student-
athletes are not employees and are not entitled to a minimum wage under the
FLSA.” Id. at *12.  However, in a concurring opinion in this decision, Circuit
Judge David F. Hamilton cautioned the court by saying that he felt that “revenue
sports” such as Division I men’s basketball and the Football Bowl Championship
Subdivision (FBS) might be looked at differently someday given that “[t]hose
sports involve billions of dollars of revenue for colleges and universities.” Id. at *13
(Hamilton, J., concurring).
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motes the position that student-athletes are not employees of their
institutions.  Such a standard, along with the IRS’s historical reluc-
tance to tax student-athletes, sustains the importance of analyzing
the potential tax implications of ESDI and LOV payouts.  As the
IRC and Treas. Regs. do not provide rules governing the taxability
of disability payouts when the payor of the premium is neither the
individual taxpayer nor their employer, the next section offers prac-
tical solutions to address the tax treatment of disability insurance
policy payouts while taking into account the aforementioned histor-
ical perspectives.
V. PROPOSALS FOR THE TAX TREATMENT OF ESDI
AND LOV PAYOUTS
As the IRS has been historically averse to imposing taxes on
student-athletes and the college sports industry in general, and as
the American legal system has not generally characterized student-
athletes as employees of their academic institutions, the Code and
Treas. Regs. offer no clear guidance regarding the taxability of
ESDI and LOV payouts.  Evaluating the potential tax consequences
of these payouts is an important addition to the minimal academic
literature currently available regarding insurance policy coverage
for student-athletes.183  An analysis of the taxability of these payouts
is also timely due to the fact that the first recorded LOV insurance
policy payout only occurred in 2015.184  Given the increasing num-
183. See generally Kain et al., supra note 13 (discussing the increasing arena of R
LOV litigation); Lens & Lens, supra note 38 (discussing the insurance options R
available to elite student-athletes); Wong, et al., supra note 44 (providing a section R
on disability policies for student-athletes); Michael D. Randall, Note, Even I Can’t
Cover Me: Examining the NCAA’s Effective Prohibition on “Loss of Value” Insurance for Its
Student-Athletes, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (2015) (analyzing the NCAA prohibition on
student-athletes exploring outside insurance to cover loss-of-value).
184. One of the earliest media records regarding ESDI or LOV insurance pol-
icy payouts emerged in 2015.  Before the start of his senior year at the University of
Oregon, cornerback, Ifo Ekpre-Olumo, purchased a LOV insurance policy. See
Xandria James, Ifo Ekpre-Olomu Collects $3M on Loss of Value Policy, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.si.com/nfl/2015/10/19/cleveland-browns-
ifo-ekpre-olomu-three-million-insurance-policy [https://perma.cc/AGD3-EXTK].
At that time, he was projected as a top twelve pick in the first round of the 2015
NFL draft. Id.  However, during practice Ekpre-Olumo tore his ACL, resulting in
him falling to the seventh round, 241st pick in the NFL draft. Id.  This injury and
subsequent drop in his NFL draft stock resulted in an insurance payout totaling $3
million. Id.  Ekpre-Olomu has been cited as the first college football player to ever
collect on a LOV insurance policy. Id. See also Andy Staples, Man Coverage: How
Loss-of-Value Policies Work and Why They’re Becoming More Common; Punt, Pass & Pork,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.si.com/college-football/2016/
01/18/why-loss-value-insurance-policies-becoming-more-common [https://perma
.cc/3NZA-DXVE]; Chase Goodbread, Silas Redd First to Collect from Loss-of-Value In-
surance Policy, NFL (Oct. 5, 2015, 2:13 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/
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ber of elite student-athletes who are listed as beneficiaries of ESDI
and LOV insurance policies, it is important to evaluate the poten-
tial tax consequences of insurance payouts when a student-athlete is
listed as a beneficiary on a policy that (1) they individually purchase
or finance, or (2) is purchased by the university they play for.185
A. Student-Athlete-Beneficiary of a Policy They Individually
Purchase or Finance
Adopting the language of the IRC, when a student-athlete
purchases an ESDI or LOV insurance policy, any resulting payout
following injury is generally going to result in a tax-free transaction.
The key to this foundation is in the identification of the actual
payor of the premium—the individual or their employer.  As previ-
ously noted, IRC § 104 exempts from gross income damages re-
ceived from personal injuries unless those amounts are paid for by
an employer.186  IRC §§ 105 and 106 reiterate this premise.187
Similar to self-employed persons and those who pay for health
insurance premiums out-of-pocket, student-athletes who personally
pay for insurance premiums will qualify for the more favorable tax
treatment allowed under the IRC should an injury payout occur.188
However, IRC § 104 requires the additional element of identifying
whether the insurance premiums are paid for with pre-tax or after-
tax dollars to fully secure a tax-free transaction.189  Thus, student-
athletes who purchase ESDI or LOV premiums using after-tax dol-
lars will qualify for the tax exclusion.190
Similarly, a student-athlete who takes out a personal loan to
finance the cost of an ESDI and LOV insurance policy should also
receive favorable tax treatment on any resulting payouts.  Although
IRC § 61 defines gross income as “all income from whatever source
derived,” taxpayers are not required to report personal loans as in-
come nor pay income tax on the receipt of such loans.191  Such
0ap3000000550500/article/silas-redd-first-to-collect-from-lossofvalue-insurance-
policy [https://perma.cc/37PH-YDGE] (reporting that Redd, formerly of USC,
may have collected on a LOV payout prior to Ekpre-Olomu).
185. See Staples, supra note 184 (noting increasing number of elite student- R
athletes who are listed as beneficiaries of ESDI and LOV insurance policies).
186. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(d).
187. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105(a),106(a).
188. See id. § 104(a)(3).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Phillip J. Closius & Douglas K. Chapman, Below Market Loans: From Abuse
to Misuse—a Sports Illustration, 37 CASE W. RES. 484, 487 (1987) (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 61(a)).
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exclusion is based on the premise that an income tax is only im-
posed on a gain or increase in income.192  As the receipt of loan
proceeds is offset by an obligation to repay the loan, the transaction
does not result in gain.193  However, if the proceeds of a loan are
not required to be repaid by the borrower, the transaction will re-
sult in taxable gain at the point when the offsetting liability is
discharged.194
A central requirement in assessing the taxability of loan pro-
ceeds is to ensure that the loan is bona-fide.  For a loan to be recog-
nized as bona-fide indebtedness for tax purposes, there must be
evidence of an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at a rea-
sonably fixed maturity date.195  Such mandate obliges the borrower
to make a promise to repay a substantial portion of the advanced
funds in order to reap the benefits of entering into a tax-free trans-
action.196  It is also important to ensure that any loan entered into
between a third-party creditor and debtor is at arms-length.  Loans
with below-market interest rates may be taxable to the extent of the
foregone interest that the debtor should have paid at the applicable
federal rates (“AFR”).197
Based on the language of the IRC, we believe that student-ath-
letes who receive injury payouts from ESDI or LOV insurance poli-
cies that they purchase themselves should not have to pay any
federal tax on such proceeds.  Additionally, student-athletes who
take out personal loans to finance disability insurance policies
should also be successful in avoiding any federal tax consequences
following an injury payout.  As the NCAA allows student-athletes to
take out loans to purchase ESDI and LOV policies without jeopard-
izing their amateur status, such loans can be secured through pri-
vate insurers or via their universities’ NCAA SAF.198  To successfully
192. See Glenn E. Coven, Redefining Debt: Of Indianapolis Power and Fictitious
Interest, 10 VA. TAX REV. 587, 600 (1991).
193. See id. at 601.
194. See id. (citing United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1931);
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a)).
195. See Kevin J. Liss, Options as Disguised Financings: The Demise of an Urban Tax
Legend, 27 VA. TAX REV. 907, 921 (2008) (citing Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399,
402 (2d. Cir. 1957)); id. at 721 n.22 (quoting Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 402 (“The classic
debt is an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain.”)); Id. (quoting I.R.S. No-
tice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357) (“listing as first among several factors in determining
whether an instrument is debt ‘whether there is an unconditional promise on the
part of the issuer to pay a sum certain.’”).
196. See id. at 721.
197. See 26 U.S.C. § 7872.
198. See 2017–18 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 19, at art. § 12.1.2.4.4 (“Excep- R
tion for Insurance Against Disabling Injury or Illness, or Loss of Value”). See also
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avoid taxation on payouts, these loan agreements should evidence
an obligation by the student-athlete to repay the loan at the point
of a prescribed date or occurrence of a specified event, and include
an arms-length rate of interest based on the AFR.199  Since evidence
of a lender’s discharge of indebtedness will automatically trigger
taxable gain, universities must ensure that loans entered into with
elite student-athletes to finance ESDI and LOV insurance policies
not be discharged or forgiven or the entire amount of the loan will
be taxable to the student-athlete.
B. Student-Athlete-Beneficiary of a Policy Purchased
By Their University
If a student-athlete receives an injury payout from a disability
insurance policy paid for by their university, it could trigger a taxa-
ble event.  This presumption is based on the language of the IRC
which allows that damages received due to personal injuries be ex-
empt from gross income unless those amounts are paid for by an
employer.200  Because the Treas. Regs. only provide a generic defi-
nition for the term ‘employer’ as “the employer maintaining the
plan . . . ,” a university that maintains and ultimately pays for ESDI
and LOV insurance plans could debatably fall within the spectrum
of this definition.201
Imposing a tax on disability payouts when universities pay the
cost of the insurance premiums would somewhat correlate with the
IRC requirements that payouts received by injured parties are taxa-
ble when their employers pay the price of the premium, since the
payor of the policy in this instance would definitely not be the indi-
vidual taxpayer.202  Applying the language of IRC sections 104, 105,
and 106 to universities that choose to pay the cost of ESDI and LOV
premiums would provide uniformity in understanding the tax con-
sequences of elite student-athletes across the country who are bene-
ficiaries of such policies.  However, adopting this posture is subject
to debate since the term ‘employer’ in the Treas. Regs. is so vague.
id. at art. § 16.11.1.4 (“Insurance Against Disabling-Injury or Illness, or Loss of
Value”).
199. Every month, the IRS publishes various prescribed rates for federal in-
come tax purposes, known as the Applicable Federal Rates (AFRs). See Index of
Applicable Federal Rates (AFR) Rulings, IRS, https://apps.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/
federalRates.html [https://perma.cc/4JT9-LT5J] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
200. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(3), 105(a), 106(a). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.104-
1(d), 1.105-1(a), 1.106-1.
201. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9.
202. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(3), 105(a) and accompanying Treasury
Regulations.
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Because American courts have consistently held that student-ath-
letes are not employees of their universities, the ambiguity of the
term ‘employer’ could result in varied interpretations of whether
the exemptions allowed in the IRC apply to student-athletes when
their universities pay the cost of ESDI and LOV premiums.203
IRC sections 104 and 105 do not specifically address the tax
consequences of a non-employer (university) paying the cost of the
premium on behalf of a non-employee (student-athlete) of a health
or disability insurance policy.  In conjunction with the NCAA’s ad-
herence to the principle of amateurism, the rather unified findings
in the American court system that student-athletes are not employ-
ees of their institutions could set the stage for a credible argument
that the language embedded in the IRC with respect to employers
paying disability insurance premiums does not directly apply to stu-
dent-athletes who receive payout benefits from policies purchased
by their universities.
This argument, however, is not entirely telling of how the IRS
would legitimately characterize the relationship between student-
athletes and their institutions for disability insurance purposes.
While judicial precedent may provide a compelling argument to
suggest that no employment relationship exists between institutions
and their student-athletes, it is important to consider the possibility
that such relationship does in fact exist from a purely tax perspec-
tive.  When evaluating the existence of an employment relationship
from a tax standpoint, the IRS and most government agencies gen-
erally rely on the application of the Right-To-Control Test.204
1. The Right To Control Test
The Right-To-Control Test requires an evaluation of the con-
tractual intent of workers in conjunction with the employers’ right
to control in determining whether an employer-employee relation-
ship exists.205  Evidence must indicate that the employing party re-
203. See, e.g., Epstein & Anderson, supra note 36, at 297 (“[T]he courts have R
been consistent in finding that student-athletes are not recognized as employees
under any legal standard, whether bringing claims under workers’ compensation
laws, the NLRA or FLSA.”).
204. See Pamela A. Izyanariu, Matters Settled but Not Resolved: Worker Misclassifi-
cation in the Rideshare Sector, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 142 (2016) (noting that the IRS
and most government agencies rely on some rendition of the common law test for
employment).
205. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 795. See also E.E.O.C. v. R
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “the
court stated that the most important factor in deciding whether a worker was an
employee or an independent contractor was the employer’s right to control the
worker’s work” while also employing an economic realities test”); Justin C. Vine,
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serve the right to control how the worker performs their duties.206
Factors considered as part of this analysis include contractual in-
tent, “the exercise of control [over the worker], the method of pay-
ment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to terminate the
worker.”207
Although the IRS adopts its own “Twenty-Factor Test” to evalu-
ate the existence of an employment relationship, the focal point of
that test relies on the identification of control and includes an eval-
uation of the degree of supervision and control over a worker, the
regularity of training, and the continuity of the relationship be-
tween worker and employer.208  This test has been met with some
skepticism due to its relative inefficiency and subjectivity.209  How-
ever, the common law Right-To-Control Test continues to be the
most dominant test employed by courts when examining the exis-
tence of an employment relationship.210
Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees of Their University, 12
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y. & ETHICS J. 235, 246–47 (2013).
206. See Izyanariu, supra note 204, at 142 (documenting that under common R
law control test, it must be shown that rideshare companies reserve right to control
rideshare workers).
207. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Re-
alities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 286 (1994). See also Rensing v. Ind. St. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983) (involving the case of a collegiate football
player who suffered a debilitating injury resulting in his claim for recovery under
workmen’s compensation).  In Rensing, the court noted, “[i]t is clear that while a
determination of the existence of an employee-employer relationship is a complex
matter involving many factors, the primary consideration is that there was an in-
tent that a contract of employment, either express or implied, did exist.” Id.
208. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (codified at Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-
1 (LEXIS through Oct. 28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register)). See also Izyanariu,
supra note 204, at 142 (noting that the IRS Twenty Factor Test primarily focuses on R
the control factor); Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 796 (noting the
IRS’s use of a derivative of the common law test); Izyanariu, supra note 192, at 142
(noting that the IRS Twenty Factor Test primarily focuses on the control factor).
209. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 798 (citing Alexandre R
Zucco, Note, Independent Contractors and the Internal Revenue Service’s “Twenty Factor”
Test: Perspective on the Problems of Today and the Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L.
REV. 599, 609 (2011)) (arguing that the IRS’s twenty factors were established to
represent a multitude of competing considerations that are not easily classifiable,
that the three categories create only arbitrary groups without specific clarification
as to any of the individual factors, and that courts have interpreted these twenty
factors in various and unexpected ways, further adding to the layer of inconsis-
tency). See also Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic
Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 113 (2009) (proposing
that the IRS twenty-factor test is insufficient “to deal with the range of evils” arising
from the misclassification of workers).
210. See Izyanariu, supra note 204, at 141.  Other common tests utilized to R
determine the existence of an employment relationship include the economic re-
alities test which is generally applied in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act
governing minimum-wage and overtime obligations, and the Hybrid Test which
37
Kisska-Schulze and Epstein: The Claim Game: Analyzing the Tax Implications of Student-Athlete
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS202.txt unknown Seq: 38 30-JUL-18 12:35
268 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 231
Identifying the extent of control that universities have over stu-
dent-athletes has been analyzed in academic literature, with schol-
ars offering persuasive evidence of the magnitude of control that
athletic departments and coaches hold.211  One legal analysis spe-
cifically focused on the degree of control that Division I-A (FBS)
football coaches have over their players, and concluded that the
Right-To-Control Test is already being met in college athletics.212
This analysis surmised that student-athletes may be subject to even
more control than those employees on campus who are financially
compensated for their work.213  Reinforcing this idea, during his
trial against the NCAA, Ed O’Bannon testified, “I was an athlete
masquerading as a student . . . . I was there strictly to play basket-
ball.”214  Others in the O’Bannon trial noted that playing college
sports was their main occupation and that it is difficult or impossi-
ble for student-athletes to function like normal students because of
the amount of time they are required to devote to their sport.215
was adopted specifically for determining employee status under federal discrimina-
tion statutes. See also Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 801–05. R
211. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 799. See also Nicholas R
Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-
Time College Athletics, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 1003, 1032 (2012) (documenting that
student-athletes’ labor and lives are subject to the control of their universities, both
on and off the field to an extent that most other employees would consider intoler-
able); Robert McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 97–119 (2006) (examin-
ing degree of control over student-athletes by their universities, including the ex-
cessive and mandatory daily practice schedules, conditioning, weightlifting
sessions, study halls, game day activities, and required travel schedules during the
pre-, regular, and post seasons); Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An
Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 65, 102 (2014) (documenting that college
athletes are subject to highly detailed control by their universities over how they
perform their services); Vine, supra note 205, at 251 (presenting that University R
athletic departments exercise enormous amount of control over scholarship ath-
letes, including attendance at mandatory practices, games, film sessions, and study
hall).
212. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 211, at 98.  Coaches’ exercise R
of control over Division I-A athletes is apparent in the form of location, duration,
and manner in which athletes participate in required practices, games, and aca-
demic commitments during the regular season, as well as the control that coaches
have over players’ lives in the off-season to include training, conditioning, team
meetings, mandatory study halls, summertime weightlifting and running, and
mandatory pre-season practices beginning in early August which encompasses the
most intensive training period of the year. Id. at 98–105.  Other demands on stu-
dent-athletes include attendance at post-season bowl games, recruitment pressures
and mandatory random drug testing. Id.
213. See id. at 97.
214. Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 807 (citing Isaac Brekken, R
Judge Rules Against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Case, CBS NEWS (Aug. 8, 2014, 8:19 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-ed-obannon-case/
[https://perma.cc/M7BT-DNU2]).
215. See Brekken, supra note 214. R
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There is now a growing spectrum of judicial cases against universi-
ties, the NCAA, and others which require an examination of the
degree of control that select parties have over student-athletes’
names, images, and likenesses.216
Based on the application of the Right-To-Control Test, it is pos-
sible that the IRS could decide to characterize student-athletes as
employees of their institutions for purposes of IRC §§ 104, 105, and
106.  However, because the language embedded in these Code sec-
tions does not specifically address the taxability of insurance policy
payouts when a non-employer pays the cost of the premium, the
underlying question is whether the IRS would choose to tax stu-
dent-athlete beneficiaries when their universities pay the premiums.
Relying on the IRS’s historical reluctance to tax student-athletes
and the college sports industry in general, we conclude the IRS
would ultimately resolve not to impose a tax on student-athletes’
ESDI and LOV payouts when their universities pay for the
premiums.
2. Maintaining the Historical Preservation of Tax Favorability
The IRS has thus far been reluctant to impose an income tax
on student-athletes’ grants-in-aid.217  Similarly, the agency has his-
torically granted positive tax positions to the college sports industry
in general based on the tax-exempt status of universities, athletic
departments, and the NCAA.218  In combination with the NCAA
and American court system’s continued adherence to the preserva-
tion of amateurism in college sports, we resolve that the IRS will
maintain its historical preservation of tax favorability of student-ath-
letes and not impose a tax on ESDI and LOV payouts when their
universities pay the cost of the premiums.
This presumption is primarily based on our reliance of the
IRS’s unwillingness to date to impose a federal tax on student-ath-
letes’ grants-in-aid, along with the agency’s stance that education
supersedes sports in the collegiate environment.  In the late 1970s,
the IRS documented that for federal tax purposes, the primary ra-
tionale for student-athletes to attend college is for educational rea-
sons.  This stance was acknowledged in two separate documents—
Revenue Ruling 77-263 and Technical Advice Memorandum 78-51-
216. See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103, at 806. R
217. See supra notes 109–135 and accompanying text. R
218. See supra notes 137–152 and accompanying text. R
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004.219  Although the U.S. Supreme Court and Tax Court have ap-
plied the quid pro quo condition of IRC § 117 to research assistants
and fellowship recipients, this condition has not been similarly ap-
plied to student-athletes receiving qualified scholarships.220  In-
stead, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 77-263 to exclude athletic
scholarships from the strict quid pro quo limitation applied by the
courts in other situations.221
Such promulgation endorsed the IRS’s stance that the benefit
which a university might receive by having a student-athlete on the
playing field is incidental to the primary purpose of collegiate
sports, which is educational.222  One year later, the IRS again noted
the connection between education and college athletics in Techni-
cal Advice Memorandum 78-51-004, noting that college sports audi-
ences contribute to the education of student-athletes.223  As of
2018, the IRS has neither challenged nor reexamined its tax treat-
ment of athletic scholarships.224  We therefore hypothesize that the
IRS will likewise find that any benefit received by a university that
pays the cost of an ESDI and LOV premium on behalf of one of its
own elite student-athletes would be incidental to the additional year
of education and course credits that the student-athlete would re-
ceive by agreeing to postpone their entry into the professional draft
for another year.
Similar to the IRS’s reluctance to impose an income tax on
student-athletes’ athletic scholarships, the sports industry in general
has benefited from favorable federal tax treatment.  As the primary
purpose of a university is to educate students, institutions and their
college athletic programs have maintained federal tax-exempt sta-
tuses.225  This interconnection between education and college ath-
letics continues to be a driving force, shielding the industry from
otherwise unfavorable tax positions.  In the 1970s, Congress
amended the IRC to specifically identify amateur sports competi-
219. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978); Rev. Rul. 77-263,
1977-2 C.B. 47, 1977 WL 43568 (1977).
220. See supra notes 113–127 and accompanying text. R
221. See Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47, 1977 WL 43568 (1977).
222. See Morehouse, supra note 129. R
223. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978).
224. See Morehouse, supra note 129.  The agency did, however, rearticulate its R
stance that athletic scholarships qualify for exclusion from gross income outside
the spectrum of quid pro quo in its letter to Senator Richard Burr (R-NC). See also
KOSKINEN, supra note 11. R
225. Haden, supra note 139, at 678. R
40
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss2/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS202.txt unknown Seq: 41 30-JUL-18 12:35
2018] THE CLAIM GAME 271
tion as being charitable.226  Although in the past the IRS endeav-
ored to impose a UBI tax on revenue from broadcasting rights from
college bowl games and a tax on corporate sponsorship income re-
ceived by tax-exempt organizations, both attempts were ultimately
thwarted following significant protests and lobbying.227
The most recent tax development that will undoubtedly impact
higher education is the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), which in-
cludes the imposition of a 21% excise tax on the five highest paid
employees of non-profit organizations who earn over $1 million per
year.228  This tax reform will also require college athletic depart-
ments in the future to mitigate the possible fallout due to the elimi-
nation of tax deductions that college boosters have been able to
receive for contributions towards season ticket purchases.229  Al-
though the TCJA evidences that Congress has now has its eyes set
on taxing certain aspects of educational institutions moving for-
ward, the final draft of the law itself does not directly target stu-
dents or student-athletes.
Our conclusion is also based on the fact that both the U.S.
court system and the NCAA have continued to adhere to the princi-
ple of amateurism in college sports, maintaining the position that
student-athletes are not employees of their institutions.230  Reliance
on this posture is important because the tax impact on disability
benefits, based directly on the language of the IRC, comes down to
who pays the cost of the premium—the employer or the individual
taxpayer.231  Neither the IRC nor applicable Treas. Regs. address
the taxability of payouts when a non-employer (university) pays the
premium on behalf of a non-employee (student-athlete).  Although
the application of IRC §§ 104, 105, and 106 could be debatable due
to the ambiguity of the term ‘employer’ in the Treas. Regs., we re-
solve that the IRS will not impose a tax on student-athlete-benefi-
ciaries of ESDI and LOV payouts due to the agency’s historical
226. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520,
1730 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
227. See supra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. R
228. TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017–2018) which became
Public Law No. 115-97 on Dec. 22, 2017.
229. Id.  See also Darren Rovell, Tax Reform Nixes Season-Ticket Donation Deduc-
tions; Schools Scramble into Action, ESPN (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.espn.com/col-
lege-football/story/_/id/21827570/tax-reform-bill-removes-deduction-donations-
season-tickets-forcing-universities-make-other-plans [https://perma.cc/R9AJ-
3LVQ].
230. See supra notes 158–182 and accompanying text. R
231. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105(a).
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reluctance to tax their grants-in-aid.232  Similarly, we theorize that
the IRS will not characterize student-athletes as employees of their
institutions under the Right-To-Control Test as the agency has thus
far not conceded to such characterization for purposes of IRC
§ 117 under the guise of the pay-for-play model.233  Unless the IRS
were to change its posture on professionalizing the college sports
arena for federal tax purposes, we presume that student-athletes
will not be characterized as employees of their institutions for pur-
poses of IRC §§ 104, 105, and 106.
3. Addressing the Taxability of Proceeds Received from ESDI and LOV
Insurance Policies
As the IRC and Treas. Regs. do not provide clear guidance re-
garding the taxability of payouts when non-employers pay the insur-
ance premiums on behalf of beneficiaries, and as more institutions
entertain the idea of paying for LOV and ESDI premiums to entice
elite student-athletes to postpone entering the professional league
draft, we feel it would be prudent for the IRS to publish a Revenue
Ruling to address the taxability of proceeds received from disability
insurance policies purchased for student-athletes by their universi-
ties.234  Similar to its issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-263, we recom-
mend that the IRS promulgate a Revenue Ruling to document its
official interpretation of the application of IRC §§ 104, 105, and
106 to ESDI and LOV insurance policies.235
A Revenue Ruling is a pronouncement issued by the IRS to
provide an official interpretation of the IRC and Treas. Regs. to a
particular set of facts.236  Revenue Rulings may be relied upon as
precedent by other taxpayers, and may be revoked or amended at
232. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9.
233. See generally Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 103 (analyzing the possi- R
bility of taxing qualified scholarships should student-athletes be deemed employ-
ees of their universities).
234. We recommend that the IRS issue a Revenue Ruling in lieu of a Private
Letter Ruling (“PLR”) in this instance.  PLRs are issued by the IRS to a single
taxpayer based on that taxpayer’s specific set of facts and circumstances.  Because
of the individual nature of PLRs, they are not relied on as precedent by other
taxpayers.  The IRS’s issuance of a PLR at the request of an individual taxpayer
(here, a student-athlete) would not provide any uniformity in applying the Inter-
nal Revenue Code to ESDI and LOV payouts when the premiums are paid for by
universities.
235. See Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47, 1977 WL 43568 (1977).
236. Understanding the IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://perma.cc/MH3M-
MYLW] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). See also Federal Tax Research: Documents & Re-
sources: IRS Rulings and Pronouncements, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, http://libguides
.law.ucla.edu/c.php?g=183332&p=4489881 (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
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any time by the IRS’s National Office.237  We believe that the issu-
ance of a Revenue Ruling would be the most appropriate method
for interpreting the application of IRC §§ 104, 105, and 106 to
ESDI and LOV insurance policies as such pronouncement would
parallel the form of guidance that the IRS historically chose to use
when interpreting IRC § 117 as applies to student-athletes.  An offi-
cial ruling in this case would clarify whether universities are to be
deemed employers for purposes of disability insurance policies,
provide uniformity in applying the IRC to student-athletes who are
beneficiaries of disability insurance policies, and confirm whether
the IRS intends to continue its favorable tax treatment of student-
athletes in a legal environment that continues to face more chal-
lenges to the status quo than ever before.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a small number of elite student-athletes in the college
sports arena, enrolling in the NCAA’s ESDI and LOV insurance
programs may be important to protect against career-ending inju-
ries and loss of future earnings.  To entice top student-athletes to
remain on the amateur playing field for one additional year in lieu
of entering the professional sports draft, some universities are elect-
ing to pay the premiums for these policies.  However, the language
of the IRC and Treas. Regs. is unclear as to whether an injury-re-
lated payout to a student-athlete-beneficiary amounts to a taxable
event if their university pays the premium.
The IRS generally requires that insurance payouts received
through accident or health plans paid for by an employer be re-
ported as income.  However, the American legal system has thus far
not generally characterized student-athletes as employees of their
institutions.  Further, under the current standard of amateurism as
adopted by the NCAA, the IRS has been reluctant to impose taxes
on student-athletes with respect to their grants-in-aid, or the college
sports industry in general.
Without any official interpretation of the tax consequences of
ESDI and LOV payouts received from insurance policies purchased
by their universities, it is currently unclear as to how the IRS would
ultimately tax the proceeds of these payouts.  Given the increasing
number of elite student-athletes who are listed as beneficiaries of
ESDI and LOV insurance policies, it is important to understand the
tax consequences of these payouts when a student-athlete is listed as
237. See UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 236. R
43
Kisska-Schulze and Epstein: The Claim Game: Analyzing the Tax Implications of Student-Athlete
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS202.txt unknown Seq: 44 30-JUL-18 12:35
274 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 231
a beneficiary on a policy that they individually purchase or finance,
or is purchased by the university they play for.
To best ensure that an injury payout received from an ESDI or
LOV insurance policy is tax-free, we conclude that a student-athlete
should purchase the policy individually.  This proposal is based on
the language of the IRC, which exempts from gross income dam-
ages received from personal injuries unless those amounts are paid
for by an employer.  Similarly, a student-athlete who takes out a per-
sonal loan to finance the cost of an ESDI and LOV insurance policy
should also receive favorable tax treatment on any injury payout
since an income tax is only imposed on a gain or increase in in-
come.  However, to ensure the loan transaction results in a tax-free
payout it must be properly structured so that the loan is not
deemed to be forgivable by the university.
Alternatively, if a student-athlete receives an injury payout from
a disability insurance policy paid for by their university, it could po-
tentially trigger a taxable event since the IRC requires that payouts
received by injured parties are taxable when their employers pay
the price of the premium.  Nevertheless, this proposal is debatable
since the definition of the term ‘employer’ in the Treas. Regs. is
vague.  Such ambiguity could result in varied interpretations of
whether universities are deemed employers of student-athletes for
purposes of IRC §§ 104, 105, and 106.  Although the IRS could
choose to characterize student-athletes as employees, we conclude
that the IRS will continue to maintain its historic preservation of tax
favorability of student-athletes, and ultimately decide not to impose
a tax on student-athletes’ ESDI and LOV payouts when their univer-
sities pay the cost of the premiums.
However, because there could be areas open to debate on this
issue, we recommend that the IRS publish a Revenue Ruling to ad-
dress the taxability of proceeds received from disability insurance
policies purchased for student-athletes by their universities to clar-
ify whether universities are employers, provide uniformity in apply-
ing the tax Code to disability insurance policies paid for by
universities, and confirm whether the IRS intends to continue its
favorable tax treatment of student-athletes.
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